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Retaliation in an EEO World 
DEBORAH L. BRAKE* 
This Article examines how the prevalence of internal policies and complaint 
procedures for addressing discrimination in the workplace are affecting legal 
protections from retaliation. Retaliation has been an unusually active field of law 
lately. The Supreme Court’s heightened interest in taking retaliation cases in recent 
years has highlighted the central importance of retaliation protections to the integrity 
of discrimination law. The Court’s string of plaintiff victories in retaliation cases has 
earned it the reputation as a pragmatic, pro-employee Court when it comes to 
retaliation law. However, this view does not account for the proliferation and 
influence of employer EEO policies and complaint procedures. Reviewing the socio-
legal scholarship on the structure and functioning of the EEO workplace reveals 
important insights into how retaliation law operates. This Article contends that, 
considered against the backdrop of how employer policies channel employee 
complaints, the picture of retaliation law for employees is not nearly as rosy as the 
Court’s decisions have led legal scholars to believe. Focusing on the interplay 
between retaliation doctrine and employers’ internal discrimination policies, the 
Article demonstrates that the lesser level of protection afforded to internal 
discrimination complaints creates stark dilemmas for employees who follow employer 
policies to complain about perceived inequality in the workplace. Two doctrines in 
particular, the reasonable belief doctrine and the notice requirement, clash with the 
role of employer policies in shaping employee perceptions of and responses to 
discrimination in the workplace. The Article concludes by offering a proposal for 
revamping retaliation law to better accommodate the realities of the EEO workplace. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most employees know something about employment discrimination law, or at 
least believe that they do. Their knowledge comes not from statutory language, 
court cases, or regulations, but from their own employers’ policies and procedures 
for addressing discrimination. Employees today operate in an EEO world—the 
familiar acronym for Equal Employment Opportunity—and have for quite some 
time. Specialized compliance personnel, often working out of discrete EEO offices, 
oversee these policies and exhort employees to follow them. And yet, the EEO 
workplace is barely visible in the world that the Supreme Court has conjured when 
it has addressed claims alleging retaliation for challenging discrimination. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s seemingly pro-plaintiff stance in retaliation cases in 
recent years,1 this Article contends that retaliation law has failed to come to terms 
with the EEO workplace, leaving employees vulnerable if they raise discrimination 
complaints through these processes.  
It is not as if the Supreme Court has kept its peace on retaliation law while the 
EEO workplace has taken hold. The Court has been unusually prolific on the 
subject of retaliation in recent years. From 2005 to 2011, the Court decided seven 
cases involving retaliation for challenging discrimination—an average of one per 
year.2 In each of these, the Court reversed a narrow lower court ruling to decide the 
issue in favor of the plaintiff. This track record has caused many observers to view 
the Court as pro-plaintiff when it comes to retaliation.3  
This reputation has developed especially because of the contrast with the 
Court’s approach to the rest of its employment discrimination docket. During the 
same time period, the Court has developed a reputation for being pro-employer 
based on several decisions that take a restrictive view of employment 
discrimination. In Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,4 although clothed in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. As this Article was nearing publication, the Supreme Court decided University of 
Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), a case that breaks the 
string of plaintiff victories in retaliation cases in the Supreme Court. In a 5–4 decision, the 
Court rejected the mixed-motive framework, requiring employees to prove but-for causation 
in retaliation cases under Title VII. While this ruling creates additional hurdles for plaintiffs 
in causation cases, it does not directly affect the interaction of the EEO workplace and the 
retaliation doctrines discussed in this Article. For a critique of the decision, see Joanna L. 
Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, Revenge: The Supreme Court Narrows Protection Against 
Workplace Retaliation in University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 
VERDICT (July 9, 2013), http://verdict.justia.com/2013/07/09/revenge-the-supreme-court
-narrows-protection-against-workplace-retaliation-in-university-of-texas-southwestern
-medical-center-v-nassar.  
 2. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville 
& Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 
(2008); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. 
White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).  
 3. It is too soon to say how the recently decided Nassar case will affect the Court’s 
reputation in retaliation law, but the tenor of this case is certainly more in line with the rest 
of the Court’s discrimination cases than the prior seven retaliation cases.  
 4. 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
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the procedural garb of Title VII’s statute of limitations, the Court’s decision 
betrayed a narrow, individualistic view of the intent required to prove pay 
discrimination.5 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,6 while ruling on class action 
certification, the Court took a skeptical view of systemic disparate treatment, 
casting doubt on the long-standing theory that substantial and unexplained 
underrepresentation of the plaintiff class in specific job categories raises an 
inference of a pattern and practice of discrimination.7 In the realm of age 
discrimination, the Court surprised even the litigants in the case, who had not 
briefed the issue, by eviscerating the mixed-motive framework under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act.8 More recently, the Court expanded the scope 
of the judicially implied ministerial exception, expanding the numbers of jobs at 
religiously affiliated workplaces exempted from coverage.9 And even though the 
Court decided for the firefighter-plaintiffs in the “reverse discrimination” case of 
Ricci v. DeStefano,10 the decision lowers incentives for employers to abide by 
disparate impact law, possibly heralding the demise of the disparate impact claim 
itself.11 
Against this backdrop, the Court’s retaliation cases appear, on balance, pro-
employee. While the Court’s decisions reveal skepticism about the extent of 
employment discrimination in the modern era, fueled by a narrow understanding of 
what counts as discrimination, the Court has been more receptive to retaliation 
claims by persons challenging discrimination. Among the commentators taking 
note of the Court’s different tune, the prevailing view is that retaliation law, unlike 
employment discrimination law, adequately protects employees. 
This Article challenges that understanding, arguing that it does not account for 
the most significant development in the field in the past two decades: the growth 
and influence of internal channels for addressing discrimination complaints. The 
Supreme Court’s retaliation decisions have been described as pragmatic and 
purposive, settling on interpretations that cohere with the purpose of enabling the 
full enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes. However, the Court has not 
grappled with the single most troubling aspect of retaliation law in light of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See Deborah L. Brake, What Counts as “Discrimination” in Ledbetter and the 
Implications for Sex Equality Law, 59 S.C. L. REV. 657, 657–58 (2008); Tristin K. Green, 
Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter v. Goodyear, 43 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (2008). 
 6. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 7. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, The Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395 (2011); Melissa Hart, Civil Rights and Systemic Wrongs, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 455 (2011). 
 8. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009); see also Melissa Hart, Procedural 
Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 264–74 (2009) (critiquing Gross). 
 9. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012). 
 10. 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
 11. E.g., Allen R. Kamp, Ricci v. DeStefano and Disparate Treatment: How the Case 
Makes Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause Unworkable, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (2011); 
Joseph A. Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 2181 (2010). 
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proliferation of internal EEO processes: the law’s lower level of protection for 
employees who pursue internal complaints compared to those who pursue external 
enforcement through courts or government agencies. As a result, the lower courts 
have developed a body of law that creates stark dilemmas for employees who use 
employers’ internal channels for complaining about discrimination—that is, 
employees who follow the employer’s rules and norms for trying to resolve 
problems internally first. This body of law, as yet unchecked by the Supreme 
Court, is anything but pragmatic, and undermines the Court’s promise of a well-
functioning enforcement mechanism for securing compliance with employment 
discrimination statutes. 
Scholars working in the interdisciplinary field of sociology and law have long 
known the importance of internal governance mechanisms for shaping employee 
understandings of, and responses to, discrimination. Their studies of the EEO 
workplace have explored the role played by personnel experts in determining the 
content of employer nondiscrimination policies in ways that broaden narrower, 
legalistic understandings.12 The resulting employer policies channel employee 
complaints through the filters created by specialized EEO personnel. This 
scholarship contains useful insights for exploring how retaliation law actually 
functions in the EEO workplace.  
Two doctrines in particular pose problems for employees who use their 
employer’s EEO policies to complain internally.13 First, internal reports of 
discrimination are protected from retaliation only if predicated on an objectively 
reasonable belief that the employer engaged in unlawful discrimination.14 While an 
objective reasonableness constraint sounds innocuous enough, courts use the 
substantive law of discrimination as the outer limit on reasonableness.15 Employer 
EEO policies, however, go far beyond legalistic definitions of discrimination to 
reach a much broader range of practices. Encompassing sexual harassment, racial 
harassment, diversity management, affirmative action efforts, and broad promises 
of respect, fairness, and collegiality, employer policies far exceed the minimum of 
what discrimination law requires. Employees who take these promises seriously 
and raise concerns when they fall short can find themselves ensnared in the 
reasonable belief doctrine, with no allowance for how their employer’s EEO policy 
shaped their beliefs. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 91–120. 
 13. The problems with retaliation law addressed in this Article are compounded by a 
distinct trend in the lower courts that leaves the employees who manage and investigate EEO 
complaints without adequate protection from retaliation for their role in these processes. This 
doctrine, and the dilemmas facing EEO compliance personnel, is the subject of a future 
article. See Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation in the EEO Office, (working draft) (on file with 
author). The present Article focuses on the problems facing the employees who use 
employer EEO processes. 
 14. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (finding internal 
complaint about sexual harassment unprotected from retaliation because plaintiff lacked an 
objectively reasonable belief that what she complained about was actually unlawful under 
Title VII). 
 15. See infra text accompanying notes 130–83. 
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Second, retaliation law requires employees who complain internally to be clear 
and precise in phrasing their complaints in terms of discrimination. For example, 
complaining about disrespectful treatment or incivility in the workplace may not be 
specific enough, under this doctrine, to put an employer on notice that the 
employee is complaining about discriminatory harassment.16 However, employer 
EEO policies and the personnel who oversee them often steer employees in other 
directions. EEO policies need not track legal nondiscrimination rights, and often 
merge broader promises of fairness with nondiscrimination guarantees. Internal 
complaint processes channel complaints away from rights-claiming language and 
into the vernacular of managerial and professional concerns. Courts applying this 
doctrine leave some complaints about inequality in the workplace unprotected for 
lack of specificity without accounting for how EEO policies shape the framing of 
employees’ complaints.17 
Despite the proliferation of internal EEO systems for handling discrimination 
complaints and renewed academic interest in retaliation law, legal scholarship has 
not explored the interaction between the two. The Supreme Court’s retaliation 
cases paint a mostly rosy impression of the state of retaliation law, one that does 
not match up with the body of law developing in the lower courts. The Court’s 
decisions do not speak to the binds facing employees who report discrimination 
under employer nondiscrimination policies. By exposing these dilemmas, this 
Article contributes both to the literature on retaliation law and to critiques of 
employer EEO processes. Critiques have questioned the effectiveness of such 
processes in ending discrimination but have not recognized that gaps in retaliation 
law may make such policies not just ineffective but actually harmful. Evaluation of 
the efficacy of internal EEO policies must consider not just prevention of 
discrimination but the likelihood of retaliation and the adequacy of legal 
protections against it. 
Part I of this Article reviews recent developments in retaliation law in the 
Supreme Court and in academic literature. The past seven years have witnessed a 
surge in retaliation cases in the Court. This Part explains those decisions and the 
issues left undecided. The uptick in retaliation cases has drawn attention from the 
legal academy, and the second half of this Part surveys the new retaliation 
scholarship. With few exceptions, commentators have reacted favorably to the 
Court’s retaliation case law, depicting it as an exception to the Court’s pro-
employer perspective in employment discrimination law generally. 
Part II describes the EEO world in which retaliation law operates. It sketches the 
explosion of employer policies addressing discrimination and the legal 
developments that incentivize them. Such policies have become so integral to 
discrimination law that it is a mistake to see them as separate and independent from 
it. Employers have much to gain by having antidiscrimination policies and much to 
lose if they do not. The resulting internal governance structure has a greater day-to-
day influence on employee understandings of discrimination than the external law 
does. This structure shapes how employees think about, express, and complain 
about discrimination. The proliferation of internal employer processes for handling 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 253–54. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 307–12. 
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discrimination complaints has important implications for the workings of retaliation 
law, which are taken up in Part III. 
Part III examines how retaliation doctrine intersects with employer EEO 
processes to the detriment of employees. In particular, two developments—the 
reasonable belief doctrine and the notice requirement—create troubling roadblocks 
for employees using internal employer channels to raise concerns about perceived 
discrimination. These doctrines undermine the promising notes sounded by the 
Supreme Court’s headliner retaliation cases. 
Part IV concludes by considering the implications of this clash, both for 
retaliation law and for assessing the role of internal EEO governance. The 
prominent role of EEO policies in channeling employee responses to discrimination 
leaves retaliation law in dire need of an overhaul. As a starting point, courts should 
reconsider the formalistic split between internal and external complaints in cases 
where employees use the EEO policies their employers have established—an issue 
that the Supreme Court has left undecided. By placing internal complaints made 
pursuant to an employer’s established EEO procedures on the same level as 
complaints filed with the government, retaliation law can resolve the dilemmas 
now facing employees who follow EEO policies to complain internally. In addition, 
in cases where courts continue to evaluate internal complaints under the opposition 
clause, they should evaluate the reasonableness and specificity of employee 
complaints in light of how they are shaped by employer EEO policies. Unless 
retaliation law adjusts to keep pace with the EEO workplace, retaliation law will 
fall far short of the Supreme Court’s expressed aims and will function to legitimate 
discrimination law’s failings rather than to secure its enforcement. 
I. THE RETALIATION REVIVAL 
Retaliation law has been an active field lately. This Part summarizes 
developments in Supreme Court case law and in legal scholarship. Despite the pro-
plaintiff decisions in the Court’s cases, its precedents continue to leave internal 
complaints of discrimination with significant gaps in legal protection. And despite 
their out-sized role in channeling employee complaints, internal EEO systems have 
not been the central focus of legal commentary on retaliation. As a result, the 
overarching message of a pro-plaintiff body of law collides with the actual 
experiences of many employees who forfeit meaningful protection from retaliation 
when they press their concerns about discrimination through internal EEO 
channels.  
A. The Retaliation Docket in the Supreme Court 
Since 2005, the Supreme Court has decided seven retaliation cases, a veritable 
bonanza given the size of the Court’s docket.18 The cases can be grouped into two 
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. That number has now reached eight, with the Nassar case, which was decided while 
this Article was being finalized. See supra note 1. This case will likely dampen the Court’s 
reputation for being pro-employee in retaliation cases. However, in following the theory of 
causation first set down in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009), the Nassar 
decision likely reflects the Court’s strict approach to causation in a discrimination statute, 
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classes. The first group addresses the question of whether protection from 
retaliation follows implicitly from a general ban on discrimination that does not 
mention retaliation. A second set of cases required the Court to determine the scope 
of a specific provision covering retaliation. In both groups of cases, the Court 
dodged strict textual arguments to embrace broad readings of the statutes, 
highlighting the need for adequate protection in order to ensure effective 
enforcement of statutory bans on discrimination. 
The cases in the first group—Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,19 
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,20 and Gomez-Perez v. Potter21—involve the 
nature of the relationship between retaliation and discrimination. In Jackson, a 
former girls’ basketball coach lost his coaching position after he advocated his 
team’s right to equal treatment under Title IX.22 The lower court had ruled that 
Title IX, which prohibits discrimination because of sex, does not support a claim 
for retaliation. In a 54 decision, the Supreme Court disagreed. Unlike Title VII, 
Title IX contains an implied private right of action, so Congress’s failure to 
mention retaliation in the statute was not dispositive, the Court reasoned.23 That left 
the Court to consider the nature of the relationship between a general ban on 
discrimination and a retaliation claim. With cryptic reasoning, the Court asserted 
that retaliation for complaining about sex discrimination is a form of sex 
discrimination itself.24 The Court’s logic is underwhelming, as it turns on the 
illegality of the discriminatory practice underlying the complaint, even though 
courts have never required proof of unlawful discrimination as a predicate to a 
retaliation claim.25 Indeed, in Jackson itself, the Court did not examine the merits 
of the coach’s discrimination complaint in upholding the retaliation claim. The 
Court’s primary concern was not theoretical consistency, but rather ensuring that 
the statute could be effectively enforced. This led the Court to extend protection 
beyond the victims of sex discrimination to include complainants such as Coach 
Jackson. While the connections between discrimination and retaliation are under-
theorized, the Court’s opinion reflects the very real and important concern that 
unchecked retaliation would eviscerate the effective enforcement of the statute. 
The next two cases, decided three years after Jackson, were somewhat easier for 
the Court to decide, but still involved textual hurdles. In CBOCS West, Inc. v. 
Humphries,26 the Court had to decide whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a Reconstruction-
era statute prohibiting race discrimination in the creation and enforcement of 
contracts, supported a retaliation claim. Like Title IX, the statute did not mention 
retaliation. Along with Jackson, the Court relied on an older precedent for support. 
                                                                                                                 
rather than a wholesale backpedaling in retaliation cases more specifically.  
 19. 544 U.S. 167 (2005). 
 20. 553 U.S. 442 (2008). 
 21. 553 U.S. 474 (2008). 
 22. He retained his position as a teacher, but lost the supplemental pay and 
responsibilities attached to the coaching position. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172.  
 23. Id. at 174–75. 
 24. Id. at 173–74, 178. 
 25. See id. at 185–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). For a critique of the Court’s reasoning, 
supplemented with a theoretical justification for recognizing the retaliation claim, see 
Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18 (2005). 
 26. 553 U.S. 442 (2008). 
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Decades earlier, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,27 the Court construed a 
similarly worded statute—42 U.S.C. § 1982, barring race discrimination in 
contracts for property rights—to support a white lessor’s challenge to retaliatory 
actions when he rented his house to a black man. At the time, the Court invoked the 
doctrine of third-party standing, allowing the white lessor to bring a race 
discrimination claim.28 The Humphries Court now explained the case as involving 
retaliation, citing Jackson in support of this reading.29 This time, only Justices 
Thomas and Scalia dissented, arguing that the text, which guarantees to “all 
persons” the “same right” to contract as “white citizens,” encompasses only race 
discrimination and not retaliation.30 The majority’s broader reading traced back to 
the same concerns about effective enforcement underlying its earlier decision in 
Sullivan. 
A more recent enactment, the federal employment provision of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), presented the Court with a similar but 
somewhat harder problem. Although the ADEA’s general provisions include a 
section forbidding retaliation, the 1974 amendment adding coverage of federal 
sector workers did not. This provision is worded more simply, forbidding 
“discrimination based on age” without detailing specific practices or mentioning 
retaliation.31 In Gomez-Perez v. Potter,32 decided the same term as Humphries, the 
Court held that this provision implicitly encompasses protection from retaliation. 
This time three Justices dissented, with Chief Justice Roberts joining the two 
Humphries dissenters, arguing that the inclusion of a retaliation provision 
elsewhere in the statute foreclosed finding retaliation implicitly covered.33 The 
majority’s way around this textual roadblock was to circle back to Congress’ 
choice of a broad general ban on discrimination, and its determination in Jackson 
that such a broad ban implicitly encompasses retaliation. The Court also noted that 
the omission was unsurprising given the choice of general language in lieu of the 
detailed listing of specific practices elsewhere in the statute.34 
In all three cases, the Court took a purposive approach to the statutes, 
recognizing protection from retaliation as necessary and implicit in a ban on 
discrimination where not otherwise excluded. While essential for securing any 
retaliation protections at all under these provisions, these cases did not address the 
scope of protections provided or how they apply to internal complaints. 
In the second set of cases, the statute’s coverage of retaliation was a given, but 
the Court had to address disputes about the scope of protection provided. Again, the 
Court decided each case in favor of the plaintiff. In the first, Burlington Northern & 
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White,35 the Court rejected the strict material adversity test 
some lower courts had embraced under Title VII, in which retaliation is actionable 
                                                                                                                 
 
 27. 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
 28. Id. at 237. 
 29. Humphries, 553 U.S. at 451. 
 30. Id. at 457–73 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting). 
 31. The federal sector provision is 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006). 
 32. 553 U.S. 474 (2008). 
 33. Id. at 496–500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 486–88 (majority opinion). 
 35. 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
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only if it alters the terms and conditions of employment. Instead, the Court took a 
more liberal approach, tying material adversity to the purpose of the retaliation 
claim.36 The standard the Court adopted reaches retaliatory acts that “could well 
dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 
discrimination.”37 The Court was careful to explain that the standard applies 
objectively, but in light of the plaintiff’s circumstances.38 This time the Court was 
on firm textual ground in refusing to tie the threshold for retaliation to the 
differently worded antidiscrimination provision, but the ruling was also supported 
by the purpose of enabling strong enforcement of the statute.39 
Three years later, in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 
Davidson County, Tennessee,40 the Court again rejected a stingy reading of Title 
VII’s retaliation provision that would have undercut enforcement of the statute. In 
that case, the plaintiff was a witness, at the behest of the employer, in an internal 
investigation into sexual harassment charges brought by a colleague. The Sixth 
Circuit had ruled that participation as a witness did not amount to the kind of 
“active” or “overt” opposition to discrimination that the statute protected.41 The 
Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, focusing on the mischief that would 
ensue if employers could freely retaliate against participating witnesses in an 
internal investigation into a discrimination complaint. The Court cited the “ordinary 
meaning” of the term “oppose,” but the policy implications of an alternative 
interpretation also informed the Court’s understanding of the term.42 The Court 
described as “freakish” a rule that would protect “an employee who reports 
discrimination on her own initiative but not one who reports the same 
discrimination in the same words when her boss asks a question.”43  
A tougher obstacle to a broad reading of Title VII’s retaliation provision 
presented itself in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.44 That case required 
the Court to decide an issue that had long vexed the lower courts: whether 
retaliation against someone other than the plaintiff, as a way of punishing the 
plaintiff by association, is actionable under Title VII. By its terms, Title VII 
protects only those individuals who engage in protected activity. Accordingly, the 
lower court ruled that an employee who did not complain about discrimination 
could not sue for retaliation when he was terminated, allegedly due to his fiancé’s 
discrimination charge.45 The Court found a path around this unpalatable result by 
using a different section of the statute setting out remedies for a “person 
aggrieved,” and by defining that provision to include persons “within the zone of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. Id. at 68. 
 37. Id. at 57. 
 38. Id. at 69–71. 
 39. Id. at 62–63. 
 40. 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
 41. Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 211 F. App’x 373, 376 
(6th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 555 U.S. 271 (2009). 
 42. Crawford, 555 U.S. at 276. 
 43. Id. at 278.  
 44. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011). 
 45. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 
863 (2011). 
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interests” of the statute.46 This necessarily includes an employee who suffers harm 
because of his relationship to the complainant, the Court reasoned, permitting the 
claim to proceed as a third-party claim for the violation of the complainant’s rights 
to be free from retaliation. The “zone of interests” test invited the Court’s inquiry 
into the purpose of the statute, which strongly supported its result.47 Otherwise, a 
spiteful employer could punish complaints by targeting an employee in a close 
relationship with the complainant.48 
Finally and most recently, in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics 
Corp.,49 the Court interpreted the retaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act (FLSA). Although not a discrimination statute per se, dealing mostly with 
wage and hour practices, the FLSA was amended in 1963 to include the Equal Pay 
Act, which covers pay discrimination between women and men.50 Accordingly, the 
case sits among the class of cases in this time span extending protection from 
retaliation to challenging discrimination. Of all the cases, this one required the 
starkest choice between a literal reading and a purposive approach to statutory 
interpretation. The FLSA’s retaliation provision forbids an employer to 
“discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint 
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under” the statute.51 The 
language “filed any complaint” was the stumbling block, since the plaintiff had 
only complained verbally to a supervisor, following the company’s internal 
grievance policy. The lower court ruled that the language “filed any complaint” did 
not encompass oral complaints.52 The Supreme Court disagreed, citing the circuit 
split on the issue to “conclude that the language of the provision, considered in 
isolation, may be open to competing interpretations.”53 But while the Court made 
an attempt to counterbalance the dictionary definition of “filed” with more obscure 
usages, its interpretation reflected attention to the policies behind the Act and how 
they would be thwarted if oral complaints were not covered.54 
Together, these seven cases give the impression of a Court strongly guided by 
the policy objectives of retaliation law and cognizant of the real-world setting in 
which retaliation takes place. The cases do not come entirely out of the blue. An 
earlier case, Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,55 read the term “employees” broadly enough 
to include former employees who experience postemployment retaliation, 
influenced largely by the policies underlying the statute. But the sheer number of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870. 
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the cases and their common theme, rejecting narrow textual readings, strike a 
seemingly new—or at least louder—chord.  
Despite their pro-employee bent, none of these cases closes the gap in retaliation 
law addressed below: the inadequate protection for employees who complain 
internally to their employer instead of externally to a government agency or court. 
All but two of the Court’s decisions say nothing about protection of internal 
complaints. And even the two that do, Crawford and Kasten, stop short of 
addressing the doctrinal challenges employees face in bringing retaliation claims 
based on internal complaints.56 While both cases are necessary and welcome 
decisions for employees, since they reject alternative rulings that would have barred 
some complainants from any protection whatsoever (witnesses in internal 
investigations in Crawford and oral complainants challenging FLSA violations in 
Kasten), they do not address the doctrinal hurdles discussed below that employees 
must clear in bringing such claims. 
While these seven cases together set up a laudable image of an anti-retaliation 
Court, they are overshadowed in their actual impact by one outlier in this plaintiff-
friendly show, a case decided over a decade ago. In Clark County School District v. 
Breeden,57 decided in 2001, the Court set lower courts on a path of markedly 
different doctrinal protections for internal discrimination complaints versus 
external complaints. The Breeden case is discussed in greater detail below, but its 
primary significance is to deny retaliation protection for internal complaints if the 
complainant lacked an objectively reasonable belief that the employer engaged in 
unlawful discrimination.58 The decision has had a devastating impact for employees 
complaining internally about discrimination, as discussed in Part IV below, but it 
has done little to temper positive reactions to the Court’s seven recent decisions. 
Now more than twelve years old, Breeden has faded into the background, where it 
remains, shrouded in the sheep’s clothing of a per curiam opinion. While criticism 
of Breeden has sharpened somewhat in recent years, it has not detracted from the 
story line of a plaintiff-friendly Court in retaliation cases. Legal scholars have taken 
notice of the Court’s new tune. 
B. Retaliation in the Legal Scholarship 
The Court’s burgeoning retaliation docket has been accompanied by a surge in 
scholarly interest in retaliation. The size of this body of work pales in comparison 
to the volume of literature on discrimination, but the uptick nevertheless marks a 
renewed interest among academics in studying the claim. Most scholars writing in 
the wake of the recent cases explore what they see as a contrast between the 
Court’s pro-plaintiff retaliation cases and its more employer-friendly readings of 
discrimination law, lauding the Court’s recognition of the realities of retaliation in 
the workplace. 
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Writing in this vein, Michael Zimmer describes the Court’s recent retaliation 
decisions as pro-employee, from an otherwise pro-employer Court, and pragmatic, 
in the sense of considering the consequences of competing interpretations and 
weighing arguments about text, legislative intent, and precedent.59 Professor 
Zimmer sees in the Justices’ opinions a model of statutory interpretation that aims 
to determine the legislative purpose behind the statute and ensure that its 
enforcement scheme works consistently with that purpose.60 He praises the Court’s 
decisions for moving the law forward and creating potentially “robust” protection 
from retaliation.61 Other scholars have likewise remarked upon the pragmatic bent 
of the decisions, contrasting it with the Court’s more formalist and pro-employer 
approach to employment discrimination cases.62 
Richard Moberly joins in describing the Court’s retaliation cases as pro-
employee, but goes a step further to articulate a guiding theory beneath the Court’s 
decisions: an anti-retaliation principle that is pro-law enforcement as its guiding 
norm.63 Viewed through this lens, the Court treats retaliation law as a law-
enforcement tool that benefits society and the legal system, and not just as a 
balancing act between employee rights and employer prerogatives. Professor 
Moberly distinguishes this core principle from one that is guided by the substantive 
norms of antidiscrimination law. He takes as the lesson from the Court’s retaliation 
precedents “that the Court rightly values retaliation protection” for its enhancement 
of law enforcement.64 Richard Carlson joins in viewing the enhancement of law 
enforcement as the guiding norm animating the Court’s retaliation precedents, 
which he discusses in terms of protecting “citizen employees.”65 While Professor 
Carlson sees greater ambivalence in the law’s overall protection of employees, he 
holds up Title VII retaliation law as a robust example against which other areas of 
employment law fail to measure up.66 
Other scholars have addressed particular retaliation decisions, raising questions 
about the scope of the rulings, while expressing general agreement with the overall 
pro-employee tenor of the Court’s decisions. Matthew Green has explored the 
question of what counts as “opposition” after Crawford,67 and discussed what kinds 
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 60. Id. at 924. 
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of relationships are protected from third-party retaliation after the Court’s ruling in 
Thompson.68 Jessica Fink has also addressed the question of third-party 
relationships, taking a narrower view than Professor Green does of the relationships 
protected under Thompson.69 Finally, Sandra Sperino has raised questions about 
agency standards for determining liability for retaliation after Burlington Northern, 
pointing to a potential disconnect if liability for retaliatory harassment proceeds on 
a different course than sexual harassment.70 While articulating lingering uncertainty 
and discussing ways to fill in the gaps, these scholars have not taken issue with the 
general story line of a pro-plaintiff tilt in the Court’s recent retaliation 
jurisprudence.71 
The major exception to the pro-employee view of retaliation law from the 
academy takes the form of critiques of the Court’s earlier decision in Clark County 
School District v. Breeden,72 a case discussed in detail in Part III.A. Even here, 
however, the case is treated as an anomaly in an otherwise pro-employee body of 
law, rather than as a major impediment to the law’s overarching protection of 
employees.73 Despite registering dissatisfaction with the decision, the critiques of 
Breeden have not captured the magnitude of the problem with retaliation law and 
its interaction with employers’ internal EEO processes. 
In the sections that follow, this Article takes a broader lens in examining just 
how badly retaliation law fits with the proliferation of internal employer processes 
for addressing discrimination. In doing so, it provides a correction to the overly 
optimistic view that the Supreme Court has created a plaintiff-friendly body of law 
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protecting employees from retaliation for challenging employment discrimination. 
Although the seven recent Supreme Court decisions discussed above are indeed 
pro-employee and pragmatic insofar as they go, focusing on the Court’s decisions 
misses the forest for the trees. As applied in the lower courts, the law falls far short 
of a pragmatist’s desire for retaliation protections that cohere with the purpose of 
antidiscrimination statutes. Beneath the pro-plaintiff veneer is a hornet’s nest of 
problems. These failings have left a much greater mark on the law in practice than 
the Supreme Court’s exhortations about the importance of protecting employees 
from retaliation. Before turning to the law’s doctrinal failings, it is important to 
acknowledge just how pervasive and influential internal EEO processes have 
become. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EEO WORKPLACE 
Perhaps the most significant development in employment discrimination law in 
the past two decades is the extent to which internal EEO policies and complaint 
procedures have become normalized in the American workplace. They are overseen 
and implemented by compliance personnel with responsibility over EEO matters, 
including but not limited to the legal requirements of nondiscrimination. A range of 
legal incentives strongly encourage employers to adopt and publicize these policies, 
and encourage employees to use them. 
A. Legal Incentives for Antidiscrimination Policies and Complaint Procedures 
Of the many ways the law incentivizes employer nondiscrimination policies, the 
most well-known apply to sexual harassment policies. In a pair of cases decided on 
the same day in 1998, the Supreme Court incorporated the existence of employer 
policies into the legal framework for determining employer liability for sexual 
harassment. Both Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth74 and Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton75 involved allegations of a supervisor’s sexual harassment of a 
subordinate. Although the Supreme Court decided in 1986 that such harassment 
violates Title VII, it did not at that time decide on a liability standard for such 
cases, indicating only that agency principles would guide the development of the 
law.76 In the intervening period, lower courts adopted a wide range of approaches, 
including predicating liability on the supervisor’s use of the agency relation to 
further the harassment, a standard tantamount to automatic liability.77 The Court 
reined in this more expansive approach to liability in these twin cases, giving 
                                                                                                                 
 
 74. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 75. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
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employers an affirmative defense in cases where no tangible employment action 
was taken. 
The affirmative defense has two prongs: first, that the employer acted 
reasonably to prevent and correct harassment; and second, that the employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s channels to prevent or 
correct harm.78 Employers can meet the first prong by having an adequate policy 
and complaint procedure for reporting sexual harassment. The second prong is 
designed to encourage employees to use the employer’s complaint process, 
although, as much scholarship documents, many employees do not, often for good 
reason.79 Since courts strictly apply prong two to employees who do not promptly 
report harassment through employer channels, employers often escape liability by 
having a policy and complaint procedure for addressing sexual harassment.80 
Despite the origin of the affirmative defense as a limitation to vicarious liability for 
supervisor harassment, lower courts are increasingly using employer policies to 
mitigate liability in cases involving coworker sexual harassment too.81 With the 
prominent role such policies now play in sexual harassment cases, it would be 
foolhardy for an employer not to have such a policy.82 
Sexual harassment law is the beginning, not the end, of the legal incentives for 
employer policies and complaint procedures. For starters, the affirmative defense 
applies to all forms of harassment covered by discrimination law, not just sexual 
harassment. So employer policies on racial harassment and other forms of 
actionable harassment are also incentivized through the same employer liability 
standards as those adopted for sexual harassment. And regardless of the type of 
harassment involved, employer liability for a constructive discharge, absent a 
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tangible employment action, is also limited by the affirmative defense, again 
making employer policies and complaint procedures highly relevant to an 
employer’s liability risk.83  
More broadly still, the role of employer policies in limiting liability risks is not 
limited to harassment cases. Employer policies are highly relevant to punitive 
damages for all types of discrimination. In Title VII cases, in order to recover 
punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that the employer acted in bad faith or 
with reckless disregard of employee rights.84 In a 1999 decision, the Supreme Court 
explained that employers can avoid such a finding if they “adopt anti-
discrimination policies and . . . educate their personnel on Title VII’s 
prohibitions.”85 This standard encourages employers to have broad policies 
covering all types of actionable discrimination, not just harassment.  
In addition to judicially crafted liability rules, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also encourages employers to adopt 
nondiscrimination policies and grievance procedures and to conduct regular 
trainings to prevent discrimination.86 As if making good on this recommendation, 
empirical research has found that the EEOC is significantly less likely to find 
“cause” for discrimination in charges filed against employers who have EEO 
policies in place than in charges filed against employers who do not.87 As this 
finding suggests, the incentives for employers to adopt nondiscrimination policies 
and complaint procedures go beyond the strictly doctrinal. Even when not directly 
tied to a liability standard, internal policies provide employers with a certain 
amount of insulation from legal claims. By establishing EEO offices, adopting 
affirmative action plans, and having policies and complaint processes for 
addressing discrimination, employers can demonstrate a visible commitment to 
nondiscrimination when legal challenges are brought.88 Employers with such 
policies achieve better outcomes in the legal system than those without them.89  
One reason for this is that the most common type of discrimination complaint, 
disparate treatment, requires challengers to prove intentional discrimination. Legal 
actors take employer EEO policies and grievance procedures as an indication of the 
absence of a discriminatory intention.90 As Lauren Edelman and her colleagues 
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have shown, employer EEO processes have greatly influenced legal norms and 
understandings about what it means to comply with antidiscrimination law—so 
much so that judges have come to equate the presence of such policies with legal 
compliance itself.91 As a result, “grievance procedures have emerged over the past 
few decades as the primary symbol of nondiscrimination and as the most rational 
way for employers to insulate themselves from legal liability.”92 This is true not 
just for sexual harassment policies, but employer nondiscrimination policies in 
general.93 
Picking up on this theme, Frank Dobbin’s book, Inventing Equal Opportunity, 
offers a historical view of the role personnel specialists, styled as equal opportunity 
consultants or (later) diversity consultants, have played in shaping understandings 
of, and compliance with, discrimination law.94 In his account, the combination of a 
broad statutory framework and a weak regulatory state left a vacuum in which 
employers responded to legal uncertainty by delegating authority to personnel 
professionals to develop detailed internal regulatory programs.95 In the process, 
employers did not merely respond to legal mandates, but played a key role in 
defining the meaning of discrimination. Courts responded, in turn, with legal rules 
that rewarded what proactive employers were already doing. Dobbin contends that 
the proliferation of employer EEO strategies—including policies, grievance 
procedures, and training programs—was not merely a response to the development 
of discrimination law but a driving force in the law’s development.96 
Whether a response to legal incentives or an agent in their development, 
employer policies for handling discrimination complaints are now standard fare in 
the American workplace. They simultaneously reflect legal incentives, shape the 
meaning of the law’s requirements, and determine institutional compliance. As 
Dobbin summarizes the extent of their influence, both “[j]ob hunters and judges are 
suspicious of firms that don’t have them.”97 
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B. The Realities of EEO Governance 
The EEO office is a fixture of the modern workplace. This is especially true for 
medium- and large-sized firms, but even companies too small to support an 
independent EEO office make sure that these responsibilities are handled by some 
staff person, along with other human resources matters.98 At the heart of these 
responsibilities is the obligation to manage employer policies for addressing 
discrimination.99 
Sexual harassment policies and complaint procedures, supplemented with sexual 
harassment training programs for employees, are by now an established part of the 
legal landscape.100 As early as 1993, a survey of human resources directors found 
that 95% of large employers, those with 500 or more employees, had policies 
specifically designed for handling sexual harassment complaints.101 And that was 
five years before the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher. 
According to Dobbin, by 1998, when the two cases were decided, 95% of all 
employers (large and small) already had grievance procedures in place that could 
be used for reporting sexual harassment.102 
Sexual harassment policies tend to get the most attention, but employer policies 
do not stop there. Policies on harassment cover not just sexual harassment but also 
racial harassment and harassment based on other status characteristics.103 Nor are 
employer policies limited to harassment. Beyond harassment, employer policies 
cover the gamut of potentially discriminatory practices of all kinds.104 In addition to 
setting up policies and complaint procedures, many employers have training 
programs designed to prevent discrimination and manage intergroup relations, 
often styled “diversity training[s].”105 
Reliable data is hard to come by, but it is the rare employer today that lacks an 
internal policy and complaint procedure for addressing allegations of 
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discrimination in the workplace.106 As these policies have proliferated, they have 
become increasingly dominant in shaping employee responses to discrimination. 
Employer policies and EEO staff encourage employees to raise their concerns 
through these internal channels instead of taking them outside the organization.107 
Few employees take the drastic step of formal legal action, such as filing a charge 
with the EEOC, to challenge discrimination and certainly not as a first resort.108 
Most workers, if they complain at all about perceived discrimination, first attempt 
to informally negotiate their rights.109 Even if employees ultimately do seek legal 
recourse, they typically first try to address problems through their employers’ 
internal complaint processes.110 
Beyond shaping the process by which employees complain about 
discrimination, employer policies have had a marked effect on the culture of the 
workplace, including on how employees perceive equal opportunity and what it 
means to discriminate. As Frank Dobbin has pointed out, the law’s open-ended ban 
on discrimination left room for personnel offices and EEO consultants to read their 
own content into the law.111 Their interpretations often exceed the strict legal 
requirements of antidiscrimination law. For example, one comprehensive text 
written for human resources professionals describes civil rights laws as a general 
mandate for workplace fairness and diversity.112 Referring to Title VII, the Equal 
Pay Act, and other federal nondiscrimination laws, the manual declares, “In 
combination these laws serve as levers to pry open the doors of economic 
opportunity for others to enter and to maintain reasonable working conditions once 
they are inside.”113 Altogether, it concludes, federal nondiscrimination laws “can be 
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 110. Moberly, supra note 63, at 435 (“Social science studies, for example, suggest that 
most reports of wrongdoing begin as internal reports.”); see also Sonia Goltz, Women’s 
Appeals for Equity at American Universities, 58 HUM. REL. 763, 771–73 (2005) (finding that 
in a study of fourteen women’s experiences suing their universities for discrimination, all 
fourteen turned to internal informal processes first).  
 111. See DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 4–5; id. at 6 (describing how discrimination has come 
to be understood as the absence of measures recommended by employer EEO personnel). 
 112. Mary E. Guy & Meredith A. Newman, Valuing Diversity in the Changing 
Workplace, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT 149 
(Stephen E. Condrey ed., 3d ed. 2010). 
 113. Id. at 165. 
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viewed as a collective wind sock, indicating the necessity to open the workplace to 
a more heterogeneous workforce.”114 In the sections that follow, this Article details 
several specific areas where EEO understandings diverge from judicial 
interpretations of the meaning of discrimination, with poor results for employees 
under retaliation law. 
The gap is particularly problematic because the interpretations of EEO 
personnel have greatly shaped employee understandings of what it means to 
discriminate. Internal policies and training programs now likely play a bigger role 
in setting norms and behavior in the everyday workplace than the external law. As 
Dobbin puts it, by “operationalizing” antidiscrimination law, human resources staff 
and other EEO compliance personnel have greatly influenced how people 
understand workplace discrimination.115 
Although the jury is still out on the effectiveness of these processes in 
preventing discrimination, the academic literature is skeptical at best.116 A common 
complaint is that these processes protect employers, giving the appearance of 
legitimacy, without helping the employees who use them.117 Employees report that 
employers frequently respond with retaliation and inaction.118 The literature on 
employee “voice” in organizations suggests that the mishandling of complaints is 
now the primary way that organizations manifest tolerance of discrimination, using 
terms for such reactions as “deaf ear syndrome” and “nullification.”119 On measures 
of job satisfaction, psychological well-being, and health, employees who pursue 
discrimination complaints with their employers generally fare worse than those 
who do not.120 
While the academic literature is largely critical of the effect of EEO policies in 
actually preventing and remedying discrimination, it has not examined the poor fit 
between these processes and the law’s protection against retaliation for the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 114. Id. at 165–66. 
 115. DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 4–6. 
 116. E.g., id. at 21 (noting absence of research on the effectiveness of employer EEO 
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 120. Goltz, supra note 110, at 765. 
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employees who use them. The next section addresses the mismatch between 
retaliation doctrine and the EEO workplace. 
III. RETALIATION LAW IN THE EEO WORKPLACE 
The starting point for understanding how retaliation law intersects with 
employer policies addressing discrimination is the law’s distinction between 
internal and external complaints. Title VII’s retaliation provision has two distinct 
clauses, the participation clause and the opposition clause. Complaints filed with a 
government enforcement agency or a court fall under the participation clause.121 
Complaints made to the employer, either informally or through a formalized 
internal complaint process, fall under the opposition clause.122 To date, absent the 
prior filing of an external complaint with the EEOC or other relevant government 
agency, the lower courts have consistently placed internal complaints solely under 
the opposition clause and outside of the participation clause, while the Supreme 
Court has stayed silent on this issue.123 The differentiation of internal and external 
complaints has its roots in the two separate clauses in Title VII, but it has worked 
its way into retaliation law under other statutes too, despite the absence of 
comparable statutory language.124 Given the significance of internal EEO complaint 
processes in shaping discrimination claims, the dichotomy between the 
participation and opposition clauses is now the central defining feature of 
retaliation law.  
Protection from retaliation is at its zenith for claims brought under the 
participation clause. An employee who files a complaint with the EEOC, a state fair 
employment agency, or a court has robust protection under this clause.125 The 
opposition clause offers much more limited protection. Two doctrines in particular 
                                                                                                                 
 
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (protecting an employee from retaliation if he or she 
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727 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the opposition clause requires a reasonable belief in 
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(6th Cir. 1989) (discussing broad scope of the participation clause); Pettway v. Am. Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1006 (5th Cir. 1969) (same). 
136 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 89:115 
 
restrict the scope of the opposition clause in ways likely to clash with EEO policies. 
First, employees lodging internal complaints must have an objectively reasonable 
belief that the conduct complained about was actually unlawful.126 Second, they 
must make clear that the subject of the complaint is discrimination and not some 
more general concern.127 The rest of this Part explores these two problems, which 
have the potential to derail the pragmatic path set by the Supreme Court’s 
decisions. 
A. “Tell Someone”/“How Could You Have Thought That?”: The Reasonable Belief 
Trap and Employer EEO Policies 
When legal scholars have criticized retaliation law, they have mostly taken issue 
with the reasonable belief doctrine. Several scholars have criticized lower court 
decisions for taking too narrow a view of reasonableness in gauging whether 
opposition to perceived discrimination qualifies as protected conduct.128 In prior 
articles, I have argued that courts mistakenly judge reasonableness by imposing 
their own understanding of the law without taking into account the inherent 
ambiguity in the meaning of “discrimination,” even as manifested in judicial 
opinions.129 The more recent reasonable belief cases have only strengthened this 
view. My focus in this Article, however, is the troubling lack of attention courts 
pay to how employer EEO policies shape employee perceptions of, and responses 
to, discrimination. The gap between the broad scope of employer nondiscrimination 
policies and the much narrower category of actionable discrimination has not been 
sufficiently explored in the legal scholarship. This Part examines recent court 
decisions rejecting retaliation claims for lack of a reasonable belief in 
discrimination. As these cases illustrate, courts often fail to consider how 
employers’ own policies and procedures shape employee understandings of 
discrimination, to the detriment of employees claiming retaliation. 
With few exceptions, courts use the established legal meaning of discrimination, 
backed up by citations to case law, as the outer limit of reasonableness. An 
employee’s broader understanding is deemed unreasonable, even if it dovetails with 
the approach taken in the employer’s own EEO policies.  
The trouble began with a seemingly innocuous Supreme Court decision, one 
apparently so noncontroversial that it came in the guise of a per curiam opinion. In 
Clark County School District v. Breeden,130 the plaintiff repeatedly complained 
about one incident of mildly explicit sexual banter. The plaintiff, her male 
supervisor, and a male colleague had been in a meeting together reviewing job 
applicants’ psychological evaluations. During the meeting, the plaintiff’s 
supervisor read aloud a report from one of the files that the applicant had once said 
to a female coworker, “I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand 
                                                                                                                 
 
 126. See infra text accompanying notes 134–35. 
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Canyon.”131 After reading the comment aloud, the supervisor looked at the plaintiff 
and said, “I don’t know what that means.”132 The coworker replied, “Well, I’ll tell 
you later,” and both men chuckled.133 No further information is given about the 
incident, but apparently the plaintiff interpreted it as an offensive reference to 
female anatomy and objected to her male colleague’s reading of the comment aloud 
and the two men’s ensuing laughter. The plaintiff complained doggedly about the 
incident, first internally, and later by filing a formal sexual harassment charge with 
the state fair employment agency. In response to the internal complaint, the 
plaintiff alleged that the company changed her job duties. The Court evaluated this 
claim under the opposition clause and ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove that she 
engaged in protected activity because she lacked an objectively reasonable belief 
that the incident in question amounted to unlawful discrimination.134 Judging the 
one incident against the severe or pervasive standard, the Court found it “at worst 
an ‘isolated inciden[t]’” and concluded that no reasonable person could have 
believed that it created a hostile environment.135 
The case exemplifies the adage about bad facts making bad law. Clearly the 
Court was correct that the incident, standing alone, did not create an actionable 
hostile environment. The Court’s reasoning, however, laid the groundwork for 
future problems by focusing on the absence of enough incidents to meet the 
severity or pervasiveness threshold at the time that the plaintiff complained. The 
Court might have avoided future problems by deciding the case on narrower 
grounds, either ruling that the incident, ambiguous as it was, was not the type of 
conduct, even cumulatively, that could create a hostile environment, or rejecting the 
claim for lack of proof of causation. Instead, the case stands as a potent precedent 
for ruling against retaliation plaintiffs whose understanding of discrimination is 
broader than the courts’ narrower view. 
Notably, the Court did not inquire into the existence of an employer policy on 
sexual harassment. However, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion noted the school district’s 
broadly worded policy on sexual harassment and counted it in support of the 
reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief.136 Explaining that the plaintiff consulted the 
policy before complaining, the court observed that the policy defined sexual 
harassment to include “uninvited sexual teasing, jokes, remarks, and questions,” 
concluding “it is possible that a reasonable person in Breeden’s position could have 
mistakenly believed that [her supervisor’s] behavior constituted unlawful sexual 
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harassment.”137 The Supreme Court’s failure to consider the employer’s sexual 
harassment policy and its bearing on the employee’s belief has had ripple effects in 
the years since Breeden was decided. The discussion below shows how courts 
respond, in cases involving a wide range of discriminatory allegations, when 
plaintiffs’ beliefs about discrimination clash with those of the court, regardless of 
how well they mesh with the employer’s nondiscrimination policy. 
1. Harassment Complaints 
Not surprisingly, since Breeden itself involved a sexual harassment complaint, 
the reasonable belief requirement has spawned a now-sizeable body of cases in 
which internal complaints about harassment are unprotected because the underlying 
conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable. As in Breeden, 
employer policies on harassment do not enter into the courts’ analysis. Most of the 
time, courts do not even mention the existence of employer policies; when they do, 
it is by way of an aside instead of integrating them into the analysis of 
reasonableness.138 
One of the more troubling examples of the Breeden standard in action is the 
Fourth Circuit’s decision in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.139 In that case, 
the plaintiff, an African American male employee, complained after hearing a 
coworker’s racial slur. The incident occurred in the office break room, where a 
number of employees were gathered around a television set watching news of the 
capture of a notorious pair of snipers, both of whom were black, who had been 
terrorizing the D.C. metropolitan area. In the presence of the plaintiff, the coworker 
exclaimed, “They should put those two black monkeys in a cage with a bunch of 
black apes and let the apes f—k them.”140 This remark bothered the plaintiff, and he 
discussed it with two other coworkers, who told him that this same coworker often 
made such comments. Following the employer’s harassment policy, the plaintiff 
reported the incident to management.141 He was subsequently terminated, allegedly 
in retaliation for his complaint. 
Applying Breeden, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint 
for failure to state a claim on the ground that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief 
that the coworker’s single outburst created a racially hostile environment. The court 
agreed that the coworker’s comment “was unacceptably crude and racist,” but 
called it “an isolated response” to the news coverage and a “far cry” from the 
severe or pervasive conduct that violates Title VII.142 While the court 
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acknowledged that repeated conduct of this ilk could potentially create a hostile 
environment, there was no proof that “a plan was in motion” to do so.143 
As an application of Breeden, the Jordan decision is troubling enough, 
illustrating the perils of applying this standard to a complaint about conduct that, 
when combined with more like it, might well create an actionable environment. 
More troubling still is the failure of the court to consider how the employer’s 
harassment policy shaped the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s response. Jordan’s 
employer had a fairly standard policy on harassment, obliging employees to report 
racially discriminatory harassment to management.144 The existence of the policy, 
however, had no bearing on the court’s analysis of the reasonableness of the 
plaintiff’s belief, which was measured solely by the substantive law of racial 
harassment.145 
Like Jordan, some of the worst offenders among the reasonable belief cases 
involve complaints about harassment, both racial and sexual. Many of these cases 
involve much more objectionable behavior than the single, allegedly off-color 
remark and laughter that occurred in Breeden. The result is a catch-22 in which 
plaintiffs must promptly report harassment to preserve their right to sue under 
Ellerth/Faragher, but are unprotected from retaliation if they complain internally 
too soon, before the perceived harassment could be reasonably understood as 
severe or pervasive. Most of the legal scholarship critiquing the reasonable belief 
doctrine focuses on the narrow space left for employees to preserve their right to 
sue for sexual harassment without forfeiting protection from retaliation for 
complaining too soon.146 While these critiques are important, there has not been 
enough attention to the role employer policies play in shaping employee 
perceptions of, and responses to, harassment. 
Courts applying the reasonable belief doctrine to harassment complaints give 
scant attention to how employer policies define harassment and direct employees to 
handle it. The courts’ failure to do so is not surprising, since in Breeden itself the 
Supreme Court did not examine the employer’s policy. Taking this cue, lower 
courts have neglected to consider how employer harassment policies influence 
employees’ perceptions and responses. The following discussion highlights some 
of the more recent cases in this vein. The cases involve reports of racial as well as 
sexual harassment, and the strictness of the reasonable belief doctrine does not vary 
by the type of harassment alleged. 
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A typical case applying the reasonable belief doctrine to a racial harassment 
report is Butler v. Alabama Department of Transportation,147 which is frequently 
cited and relied on by district courts. In this case, the plaintiff, an African American 
woman, complained about two racial slurs a white coworker made while they were 
driving back from lunch together. She alleged that she was fired for complaining 
about the coworker’s use of a racist epithet. The jury found for the plaintiff on the 
retaliation claim, but the appellate court reversed. As the court saw it, the plaintiff’s 
belief that two uses of an “ugly, racist” epithet created a hostile environment was 
“not even close” to being objectively reasonable.148 Citing circuit precedent, the 
court found the conduct fell far short of the legal standard.149 Significantly, the 
court evaluated the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief without any reference to 
the existence or content of any employer policies covering racial harassment. As a 
state employer, there likely would have been a detailed nondiscrimination policy 
covering harassment, including racial harassment, and encouraging employees to 
report it. It would be curious and unusual if such a policy exempted lunch breaks or 
told employees not to bother if the harassment only amounted to two “ugly, racist” 
epithets. 
The cases take a similar approach to employee complaints of sexual harassment. 
Another Eleventh Circuit case, Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc.,150 is illustrative. 
There, the court ruled that the plaintiff, a waitress, could not have had a reasonable 
belief that the manager’s demeaning comments about her breasts, combined with 
other sexually tinged comments, amounted to a hostile environment.151 
Remarkably, the court upheld summary judgment for the employer despite the 
EEOC’s issuance of a for-cause determination on the plaintiff’s underlying sexual 
harassment charge. The court not only ruled against her on the harassment claim, 
but rejected her retaliation claim because it was unreasonable to believe that the 
harassment was unlawful.152 The court made no mention of a company policy 
covering sexual harassment in the workplace. 
There are myriad cases like these that use the reasonable belief test to exclude 
allegations that fall short of actionable harassment but go well beyond what 
occurred in Breeden. In many cases, an employer policy on harassment is 
mentioned in the background but not considered in the court’s analysis. In one of 
these, Van Portfliet v. H&R Block Mortgage Corp.,153 the plaintiff, a male sales 
manager, reported two accounts of harassment relayed to him by a female loan 
manager whom he supervised. Both accounts involved their superior, a district 
manager. The first occurred at a company-sponsored happy hour, in which the 
district manager put his arm around the female loan officer and made an 
inappropriate remark.154 The second happened that same evening, when the same 
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district manager made a racial slur in the presence of an African American loan 
officer.155 After learning of these incidents, the plaintiff reported them to the human 
resources department. An investigation ensued, resulting in the district manager’s 
termination. The plaintiff claimed that the new manager retaliated against him for 
his role in these events. The jury agreed, but the verdict was overturned for lack of 
a reasonable belief that the district manager had engaged in actionable harassment. 
As the court put it, “The notion that this conduct comes close to constituting 
unlawful sexual harassment is patently unreasonable.”156 
In this case, the court acknowledged that the plaintiff had followed the 
company’s harassment policy in reporting the two incidents to the company’s 
human resources department.157 That was the extent of the court’s attention to the 
policy, however. It had no bearing on the court’s analysis, which began from the 
premise that the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief is measured by existing 
law.158 Nor did the plaintiff receive any leniency for acting on behalf of people he 
supervised.159 The court applied the reasonable belief doctrine with the same 
stringency as if he himself had experienced the offensive behaviors. 
Other courts likewise ignore harassment policies in judging the reasonableness 
of employee beliefs about harassment. In Hill v. Guyoungtech USA, Inc.,160 the 
court ruled that the plaintiff’s complaint about her male manager slapping her on 
the buttocks lacked an objectively reasonable belief since it was a single incident. 
The court sounded almost gleeful in citing a plethora of precedents with detailed 
parentheticals describing more explicit and offensive sexual conduct where courts 
nonetheless granted summary judgment to employers for lack of sufficient severity 
or pervasiveness.161 Lest one misinterpret these citations for judicial approval of the 
behavior, the court added a disclaimer that the manager’s “act of slapping 
[plaintiff] on the buttocks in an effort to make her comply with his demand [to pick 
up equipment that had spilled onto the floor] is certainly not condoned by this 
                                                                                                                 
plaintiff’s supervisor, had put his arm around the female loan officer, pulled her into him, 
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court, however, it was not an act which reasonably could be perceived as sexual 
harassment under Eleventh Circuit law.”162  
This court too observed that the company had a sexual harassment policy. In a 
cryptic description of the policy, the court noted that it instructed employees who 
believed they had experienced sexual harassment to report it to human resources, 
which the plaintiff did.163 The court said nothing further about the substance of the 
policy or how the plaintiff understood it to apply to her. The policy had no effect on 
the court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief that she had 
been harassed. 
It is a common refrain in the reasonable belief cases involving harassment 
complaints that isolated or sporadic offensive comments do not meet the severity or 
pervasiveness test for a hostile environment, so objecting to them is not protected 
activity.164 In none of these cases do the courts consider how the plaintiffs’ beliefs 
are influenced by employer policies on harassment.  
Although these kinds of decisions have accelerated in the aftermath of Breeden, 
there was some movement in this direction even before. In one of the earliest, Little 
v. United Technologies,165 the Eleventh Circuit ruled as a matter of first impression 
that an employee’s complaint about a coworker’s single racially offensive remark 
was not “protected activity” under the opposition clause.166 The court reasoned that 
the incident was not an unlawful employment practice because an employer is 
liable for coworker harassment only if it knew or should have known of the 
harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.167 The decision leaves 
employees in a catch-22: in order to put the employer on notice of coworker 
harassment, an employee must report it. If the employer can retaliate against the 
reporting employee with impunity, on the theory that the harassment is not yet 
attributable to the employer, the chilling effect of potential retaliation could insulate 
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the employer from liability for coworker harassment. Few employees would risk 
reporting harassment if doing so might not only get them fired, but also leave them 
without recourse for any ensuing retaliation.  
The Little case was decided one year before the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Ellerth and Faragher, so it is not so surprising that the court did not consider how a 
workplace policy on harassment might affect the reasonableness of the employee’s 
response; such policies, though common in the workplace, were not yet on the 
radar screen of courts deciding harassment cases. However, the court’s reasoning 
makes employer policies irrelevant even now, despite their prominence and 
integration into harassment liability standards. The Little decision and the cases 
following it create an especially difficult situation for employees responding to 
coworker harassment through employer anti-harassment policies.  
The problems with the reasonable belief doctrine in these cases are compounded 
by the sheer breadth of employer harassment policies. Employer policies on 
harassment are much broader than the law’s approach to actionable harassment.168 
As Vicki Schultz pointed out in her critique of employer responses to sexual 
harassment law, employers prohibit conduct far exceeding what would violate the 
law.169 The language in employer policies moves seamlessly from the legal 
requirements of a harassment claim to much broader notions of incivility and 
disrespect.170 Even where employer policies purport to track legal definitions of 
harassment, the legal standards themselves are anything but precise. For example, 
harassment policies often incorporate the definition from the 1980 EEOC 
guidelines: 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
harassment when . . . such conduct has the purpose or effect of 
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or 
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.171 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. See DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 201 (“The general anti-harassment policy might cover 
activities not yet imagined by plaintiffs, but which would someday be forbidden by the 
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This language encompasses a much broader category of conduct than what a 
court would necessarily find to be actionable. Even the relatively mild innuendos in 
Breeden could arguably fall under this definition.172 Where employer policies offer 
more concrete examples, the examples often include the kinds of isolated, offensive 
comments courts dismiss as insufficient in the reasonable belief cases. Sexual 
jokes, remarks, and gestures are often listed as among the kinds of behaviors 
covered by harassment policies.173 Moreover, employer policies typically 
encourage or even require employees to report any harassing behaviors right away, 
without waiting for the incidents to accumulate until they become severe or 
pervasive.174 In fact, a directive to wait to report until the harassment becomes 
severe would be inconsistent with the reason why the law incentivizes having 
harassment policies and why it behooves employers to have them: to stop harassing 
behaviors before they violate the law. The bottom line is, the reasonable belief 
cases do not account for how employer policies shape employee perceptions of, and 
responses to, harassment in the workplace, to the peril of the employees who report 
it. 
2. Beyond Harassment: Other Discrimination Complaints 
The harassment cases are just the tip of the Breeden iceberg. Sexual harassment 
policies get the most attention, but employer nondiscrimination policies reach much 
further than harassment, setting up the reasonable belief doctrine to clash with other 
kinds of discrimination complaints as well. This tension between broadly worded 
EEO policies and a strict application of the reasonable belief doctrine arises in 
cases involving a wide range of discrimination complaints. Here too, the reasonable 
belief cases fail to account for gaps between the scope of employer policies and the 
narrower reach of discrimination law. Courts maintain their resolve that the 
reasonableness of the employee’s perception of discrimination is measured against 
the substantive law, unaffected by broader coverage in employer policies.  
While harassment complaints appear the most frequently in the reasonable belief 
cases, examples of other kinds of discriminatory practices can also be found in the 
case law. In one such case, EEOC v. Kumi Manufacturing Alabama, LLC,175 the 
court faulted the EEOC for failing to prove that an African American employee 
held an objectively reasonable belief that he was opposing unlawful discrimination 
when he objected to the employer’s use of written employment tests—specifically, 
its accommodation of Hispanics but not African Americans with a modified oral 
test. To rebut the reasonableness of the employee’s belief, the court cited case law 
approving the use of written exams absent proof of a discriminatory intent or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. While clearly not actionable under judicial precedents, the conduct arguably 
included an unwelcome sexual comment and created an offensive working environment for 
the plaintiff. 
 173. See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra note 94, at 198. 
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application against African Americans.176 Since the employee had no evidence that 
the employer acted with a discriminatory intent, he was obliged to accept the 
employer’s explanation that the accommodation was warranted only for Spanish-
speaking employees. Accordingly, the court reasoned, the employer’s refusal to 
offer the accommodation to African American test takers could not reasonably be 
viewed as discriminatory under the governing law.177 As this case illustrates, the 
reasonable belief test applies just as strictly to complaints about employer practices 
with a disparate impact as it does to complaints about perceived harassment. EEO 
policies and practices, however, have evolved to include broad oversight of 
employer practices with a disparate impact, even beyond what is strictly required 
by discrimination law.178 
Complaints about disparate treatment in the workplace get the same treatment. 
Indeed, there appear to be many ways the reasonable belief doctrine can ensnare an 
unsuspecting complainant who is not steeped in the nuances of discrimination law. 
Unfamiliarity with the materially adverse requirement is one of them. In Howard v. 
Walgreen Co.,179 the appellate court invoked the reasonable belief doctrine to 
overturn a jury verdict for the plaintiff on his retaliation claim, reversing the district 
court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law. In this case, the flaw in the 
underlying merits of the discrimination complaint was that the purportedly 
discriminatory action did not rise to the level of material adversity required under 
Title VII.180 The plaintiff, an African American pharmacist, had complained about 
what he perceived as a racially discriminatory threat to terminate him in a message 
left on his voicemail.181 In the message, his white supervisor threatened to fire him, 
and the plaintiff had reason to believe that the threat was motivated by racial bias. 
After he complained about the threatening message, he actually was fired.182 He 
brought a retaliation claim and won before a jury. The appeals court overturned the 
verdict, ruling that a discriminatory threat to fire an employee (as opposed to a later 
termination) is not materially adverse. Since the threat was not materially adverse, 
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable belief that it violated Title VII.183 The court 
did not mention the existence of an employer policy, but its reasoning makes plain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Id. at *30–31. 
 177. Id. at *35–37. 
 178. Stephen E. Condrey, Introduction: Toward Relevant Human Resource Management, 
in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at 
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 180. Id. at 1245. 
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that even a broadly worded policy promising nondiscriminatory treatment in all 
instances would have made no difference. 
As these examples show, it is not just harassment complaints that get sacked by 
the reasonable belief doctrine. The lower court cases have traveled far from the 
facts in Breeden to deny protection to any complaints about discriminatory 
practices that do not conform to the substantive law of discrimination.  
3. Complaints Blurring the Boundary Between Affirmative Action and 
Nondiscrimination 
The boundary between nondiscrimination and affirmative action is an especially 
thorny one for complainants. Courts have applied the reasonable belief doctrine 
strictly, and with no regard for employer policies blurring these principles, to 
employee complaints about the employer’s failure to implement an affirmative 
action plan. Employer EEO policies and practices, however, often mix promises of 
nondiscrimination with commitments to affirmative action.184 As Frank Dobbin 
explains in his study of how personnel offices invented modern understandings of 
employment discrimination, EEO staff merged their compliance strategies for 
nondiscrimination with their affirmative action efforts.185 As a result, affirmative 
action and nondiscrimination may be lumped together in the same policies and 
administered by the same staff persons.186 The reasonable belief cases, however, 
treat these obligations as separate and unrelated. Courts reject retaliation claims 
involving complaints about the employer’s failure to implement affirmative action 
plans for want of an objectively reasonable belief that an employer’s refusal to 
engage in affirmative action violates Title VII. 
In one of the first cases to take this approach, Holden v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,187 
the plaintiff, who managed the company’s affirmative action office, claimed that 
she suffered retaliation for attempting to bring the employer into compliance with 
the federal executive order requiring contractors with the federal government to 
meet affirmative action goals and timetables.188 In a bench trial, the district court 
ruled for the plaintiff, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding a lack of protected 
activity because it was unreasonable to believe that failure to meet the affirmative 
action requirements of the executive order violated Title VII.189 The court’s 
reasoning posited a clear separation between affirmative action and 
nondiscrimination, with only the latter required by Title VII.190 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Norma M. Riccucci, Affirmative Action, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT, supra note 112, at 455, 469 (describing employer EEO 
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Subsequent cases have reached similar results. In Phillips v. Pepsi-Cola General 
Bottlers, Inc.,191 the Sixth Circuit used similar reasoning to uphold summary 
judgment for the employer in a retaliation claim brought by the company’s 
affirmative action officer. The court followed Holden to rule that the plaintiff’s 
efforts to increase the representation of women and minorities were not protected 
activity under Title VII.192 Similarly, in Manoharan v. Columbia University 
College of Physicians & Surgeons,193 the plaintiff’s complaints that the university 
failed to follow its affirmative action goals and gave insufficient attention to 
minority candidates in a particular hiring decision were not protected activities.194 
In these and other cases, courts have labeled it unreasonable to believe that an 
employer’s failure to follow its affirmative action goals violates Title VII.195 
These decisions fail to recognize that the legal terrain separating affirmative 
action from nondiscrimination is slippery at best. Judges and legal scholars alike 
have struggled with the boundary between these two conceptions of equal 
opportunity.196 Indeed, a small but notable body of legal precedent holds that the 
knowing failure to take specific action to increase minorities’ or women’s 
representation in the workplace might, in some circumstances, amount to 
intentional discrimination.197 The uncertainty facing employees over where to draw 
this line is compounded by employers merging the two concepts and their 
requirements under the same policy. EEO policies generally locate responsibility 
for both sets of obligations in the same office or person and cover both obligations 
under common language in the same policies. The widely used self-identification 
as an EEO employer has come to stand both for an employer who complies with 
nondiscrimination requirements and for one who affirmatively undertakes to have a 
diverse workforce that includes members of historically underrepresented groups. 
Courts gloss over this complexity, and the role of employer policies in contributing 
to it, when they label it unreasonable to pursue affirmative action goals under the 
guise of opposing discrimination. 
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4. Complaints Challenging Discrimination Against Unprotected Groups 
The reasonable belief case law is equally unforgiving when employees complain 
about discrimination on the basis of a status that is not protected under federal 
employment discrimination law. Employer nondiscrimination policies are often 
much broader than the scope of discrimination law, promising equal opportunity to 
groups left outside the protected categories of Title VII and other federal statutes. 
This problem arises most often in the realm of sexual orientation and gender 
identity discrimination, since these characteristics are frequently covered by 
employer policies but are outside the scope of federal employment discrimination 
protections. 
Courts routinely apply the reasonable belief doctrine to dismiss retaliation 
claims where the underlying complaint involves discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, an unprotected status under Title VII. In Hamner v. St. Vincent 
Hospital & Health Care Center, Inc.,198 one of the earlier cases of this order, the 
plaintiff, a gay man employed as a nurse, complained about harassment through the 
hospital’s grievance procedure.199 The harassment included conduct by a supervisor 
who mocked him by lisping, flipping his wrists, and making anti-gay jokes.200 The 
plaintiff considered these behaviors to be sexual harassment, but the court 
characterized this belief as unreasonable, viewing the harassment as targeting the 
plaintiff’s sexual orientation.201 Since sexual orientation is not a protected class 
under Title VII, the court reasoned, the complaint was not protected activity under 
the opposition clause.202 Other than to note that the plaintiff pursued the complaint 
through the employer’s grievance procedure, the court said nothing about the 
hospital’s EEO policies—neither how the hospital defined sexual harassment nor 
the scope of coverage in the policy and whether it extended to sexual orientation.203 
Under the court’s reasoning, it would have made no difference if the employer’s 
EEO policies had expressly included sexual orientation along with the protected 
classes covered under Title VII, as many employer policies do.204 Indeed, courts 
have ruled the same way despite the existence of employer policies specifically 
prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination. In Higgins v. New Balance Athletic 
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Shoe, Inc.,205 the inclusion of sexual orientation in the employer’s 
nondiscrimination policy did not help the plaintiff past the reasonable belief hurdle. 
Although decided before Breeden, the court anticipated and applied the reasonable 
belief requirement without regard to the broader coverage of protected groups 
under the employer’s nondiscrimination policy.206 
In recent years, more employers have added sexual orientation and gender 
identity to their nondiscrimination policies.207 Employer EEO practices are 
nowhere near as insistent as courts in delineating a sharp boundary between sex and 
sexual orientation in overseeing fair employment practices. For example, a leading 
text for human resources professionals describes a case in which an employee was 
harassed for being “a gay female” as a case involving “sexual harassment.”208 
However, courts continue to rule sexual orientation outside the protections of Title 
VII.209 This gap between employer policies and Title VII coverage leaves 
employees highly vulnerable to retaliation when they challenge bias against a group 
that is included in the employer nondiscrimination policy but outside the 
protections of employment discrimination law. Once again, courts strictly apply the 
reasonable belief doctrine based on existing law, unmediated by the broader scope 
of employer policies. 
5. Complaints About the Treatment of Non-Employees 
Complaints about the discriminatory treatment of non-employees have also 
butted up against the reasonable belief doctrine. Courts have ruled unreasonable 
employee understandings that extend nondiscrimination commitments to persons 
who are not employed by the employer, such as clients or members of the 
community. When these kinds of complaints are involved, courts use the 
reasonable belief doctrine to draw a sharp line between the employer’s treatment of 
its employees and the employer’s treatment of others. A recent case of this order, 
Bonn v. City of Omaha,210 involved a complaint by a city employee whose job as 
public safety auditor required her to review and audit citizen complaints about 
police officers’ treatment of citizens. She lost her job after writing a report 
criticizing the police department for tolerating racially biased policing practices. In 
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the report, she chided the department’s lack of success in “recruiting or maintaining 
a diverse workforce” and connected this failing to its poor relations with the 
minority community.211 Rejecting her retaliation claim for lack of protected 
activity, the court explained that racially biased policing was not an unlawful 
employment practice under Title VII.212 Although the court did not disagree that 
such practices might negatively affect the recruiting of minority officers, it found 
the allegations “far too attenuated from actual employment practices” to support a 
reasonable belief that the department was violating Title VII.213 Other courts have 
used similar reasoning to reject retaliation claims by employees who complained 
about police department bias against persons of color in the community.214 
In ruling the plaintiff’s belief unreasonable, this approach overstates the degree 
of attenuation between racial bias in policing and in the hiring of police officers. 
For instance, the court in Bonn emphasized that the plaintiff did not allege that the 
department intended to affect minority recruiting through its police practices.215 
However, such tactics might nevertheless have a disparate impact on minority 
applications that could plausibly form the basis for a Title VII disparate impact 
claim. The court’s reasoning also ignores the possibility, recognized in early Title 
VII case law, that the discriminatory treatment of clients can potentially create a 
racially hostile environment for employees.216  
Indeed, media coverage of the class action lawsuit against Denny’s, in which 
African American customers challenged discriminatory service at the restaurant, 
revealed links between discrimination against customers and the racial environment 
for employees, connecting the all-white management team and a racially hostile 
workplace to the discriminatory treatment of customers.217 The settlement, while 
primarily focused on the restaurant’s relations with its customers, also included 
provisions addressing race discrimination against employees.218 As the Denny’s 
litigation illustrates, it is far from unreasonable to think that the racially 
discriminatory treatment of clients and constituents is related to racial inequality in 
employee work environments. 
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Most problematic, the court in Bonn did not consider how the employer’s 
nondiscrimination policy might have influenced the plaintiff’s view that the city’s 
nondiscrimination obligations included a duty to weed out practices that interfere 
with the recruitment of a diverse workforce. The opinion is silent with respect to 
the city’s internal policies, but as a public employer, the city likely had a detailed 
EEO policy.219 Such policies often lump together loosely related promises of 
nondiscrimination, equal employment opportunity, and a commitment to 
diversity.220 
A related collection of cases applies a similar principle to employees of 
educational institutions complaining about perceived discrimination against 
students.221 The court in Bonn cited some of them, noting with a tinge of 
impatience, “[w]e have explained more than once that ‘opposing an employer’s 
actions outside the ambit of an employment practice is unprotected by Title 
VII.’”222 These cases draw a similar line, ruling that Title VII does not protect 
employee complaints about the discriminatory treatment of students since it would 
be unreasonable to believe that discrimination against students violates Title VII.223 
These courts, too, make no reference to school or university nondiscrimination 
policies, which may combine in the same policy the institution’s nondiscrimination 
obligations toward faculty, staff, and students alike, and invite broad input and 
participation from the educational community in securing these promises.224 After 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Jackson, an employee experiencing retaliation for 
such complaints might still find protection under Title IX (for sex) or Title VI (for 
race), even if not under Title VII. Nevertheless, the more holistic approach to 
nondiscrimination reflected in the EEO policies of educational institutions belie 
such a fine parsing of lines as to negate a Title VII retaliation claim protecting 
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employee complaints about the discriminatory treatment of other members of the 
educational community. 
Through promises of diversity, broad definitions of equal employment 
opportunity, and inclusive commitments of nondiscrimination toward all persons 
served, EEO policies blur lines that discrimination statutes sharply and rigidly 
enforce. As a result, employees who act on these promises to protect the rights of 
nonemployees cross these lines at their peril. 
6. The Factual Support Required to Complain 
The reasonable belief doctrine requires not only support in the substantive law 
but also sufficient facts to support an objectively reasonable belief that unlawful 
discrimination has occurred. This too creates tensions with employer policies. 
Employees risk being labeled unreasonable and left unprotected from retaliation for 
stepping forward to complain about discrimination based on speculative reasons 
without hard, cold facts to support them. And yet, employer EEO policies may 
offer little guidance about the kinds of facts an employee should know before 
complaining about discrimination and instead direct employees to report their 
concerns through the specified channels without delay.225 Waiting to gather facts 
takes time and may not be compatible with reporting problems as soon as they 
arise. 
The case law illustrates this bind. If the employee’s complaint objects to a form 
of disparate treatment, the factual support for a legal challenge would require proof 
that the employer acted with the kind of discriminatory intent the law requires. For 
example, in Butler v. Raytel Medical Corp.,226 the plaintiff complained to the 
company’s human resources department about what he perceived as racial 
“favoritism” by his supervisor.227 The court rejected his retaliation claim, faulting 
him for not having had a reasonable belief that discrimination occurred since he 
“put forward little, if any, evidence of [his supervisor’s] racial animus” and “spoke 
in vague terms and could not give details.”228 He lost the retaliation claim, in part, 
for lack of the kind of factual record necessary to support an objectively reasonable 
belief in discrimination.229 Similarly, in Woods v. Enlarged City School District,230 
the court ruled that a female African American assistant principal’s complaint 
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about race discrimination was not supported by a reasonable belief because “the 
record is devoid of any evidence showing racial animus or bias,” and “shows, at 
most, that plaintiff was shamefully mistreated by a group of teachers who were 
Caucasian and that her supervisor ineffectually handled the situation.”231 In such 
cases, employees have no recourse for retaliation if they complain about perceived 
discrimination without specific examples of more favorably treated comparators 
who are outside of their protected class but are otherwise sufficiently similar to 
support an inference of unlawful discrimination.232 
Once again, the courts’ application of the reasonable belief doctrine does not 
comport with how employer EEO policies approach employee complaints. 
Employees are not all cut from the same cloth; they make inferences about 
discrimination with varying levels of factual support.233 But employer policies do 
not come with warnings to employees to wait to complain until they have adequate 
factual support, nor do they instruct employees on what kind of factual record they 
should compile before they complain. Rather, such policies openly invite 
employees to come forward with any concerns based on their own perceptions.234 
This presents a conflict with the stringency of the reasonable belief doctrine, which 
requires the kind of factual support necessary to make a reasonable claim of 
unlawful discrimination. 
7. Special Problems for Supporting Witnesses in Internal EEO Processes 
In addition to the gap between how courts understand discrimination and how 
complainants who consult employer policies are likely to understand it, the 
reasonable belief doctrine creates other difficulties in the EEO workplace as well. 
Special problems arise when the retaliation is directed against an employee other 
than the complainant who provides helpful information in the complaint-
investigation process. In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and 
Davidson County, Tennessee,235 the Supreme Court ruled that participating as a 
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supporting witness in an employer’s internal investigation of a discrimination 
complaint is protected activity under Title VII’s opposition clause.236 The Court’s 
ruling is surely correct, since leaving witnesses unprotected from retaliation would 
call into question the very legitimacy of such processes and tear large loopholes in 
the fabric of retaliation law. However, by deciding the case under the opposition 
clause instead of the participation clause, the decision does not adequately protect 
supporting witnesses, who still must clear the reasonable belief hurdle in order to 
obtain protection. This was not a problem in Crawford itself since the sexual 
harassment allegations clearly met the legal threshold for an actionable hostile 
environment, but it is likely to pose problems in other cases.  
Under Crawford, an employee who provides supporting statements in an 
internal investigation into discrimination is only protected from retaliation if the 
statements are based on an objectively reasonable belief that the underlying 
conduct was actually unlawful.237 The same level of stringency with respect to the 
governing substantive law and necessary factual support would still apply. These 
difficulties are magnified when applied to corroborating witnesses in an employer’s 
internal investigation. The employee may have little choice but to answer questions 
and provide relevant information in such an investigation, and indeed, may be 
required to do so under the employer’s discrimination policy. 
Although few reported cases involve claims of retaliation against 
noncomplainants under the opposition clause, so far courts have applied the 
reasonable belief requirement unmodified in such settings. For example, in the pre-
Crawford case of Barker v. Missouri Department of Corrections,238 the plaintiff 
claimed retaliation after assisting another employee in making a discrimination 
complaint. The plaintiff, a union shop steward, helped his male coworker file a 
sexual harassment grievance. The court rejected the retaliation claim on the 
grounds that the plaintiff lacked a reasonable belief that what happened to his 
coworker was unlawful discrimination.239 The underlying allegations consisted of a 
comment made to the coworker, a correctional officer in a women’s prison, by his 
female supervisor, stating that he would need training to work in a particular unit 
even though a female coworker did not because “women are better by and large as 
they do a better job than men do anyway and are more patient and nurturing than 
men and we have no complaints about them.”240 
Consistent with other decisions applying the reasonable belief doctrine to 
harassment complaints, this court explained that, even if offensive, this single 
comment did not create an actionable hostile work environment for the male 
coworker.241 Accordingly, any belief that it did was objectively unreasonable. What 
stands out about this case is that the court applied the reasonable belief doctrine not 
to the actual complainant, the target of the alleged harassment, but to the fellow 
employee who assisted him in filing a grievance. The court’s reasoning would lead 
to the same result if, instead of helping the coworker file a grievance, the plaintiff 
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had testified truthfully in support of the coworker in an internal investigation. Like 
the other reasonable belief cases discussed above, the court did not mention the 
employer’s policies despite the likely existence of a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
When employer EEO policies establish complaint procedures and processes for 
investigating complaints, employees other than the complainant may become 
involved in the ensuing investigations. Even more so than the complainant, these 
employees may not have enough factual or legal knowledge to objectively evaluate 
the reasonableness of the underlying complaint. Applying the reasonable belief 
doctrine to them, when they may have little choice but to participate in the 
employer’s process, raises the same kinds of concerns that the Supreme Court 
strived to avoid in the Crawford decision—it makes a mockery of EEO processes if 
supportive witnesses are vulnerable to retaliation when the underlying complaint 
lacks a sufficient legal or factual foundation. By leaving the claim under the 
opposition clause, without any modification of the reasonable belief doctrine, the 
Court failed to secure either the integrity of retaliation law or the legitimacy of the 
EEO processes that the law so heavily incentivizes. 
8. Concluding Thoughts on Causation, Complexity, and the Clash with EEO 
Policies in the Reasonable Belief Doctrine 
The strictness of the reasonable belief doctrine may well mask an unarticulated 
concern in retaliation cases that the law not intrude too deeply into employer 
prerogatives to base employment decisions on discretionary reasons—for example, 
the employment at-will doctrine.242 On my reading of these cases, judicial 
skepticism about the plaintiff’s ability to prove causation (that the adverse action 
stemmed from a retaliatory reason) pervades the reasonable belief cases. Indeed, in 
many of the cases discussed above, the facts on causation do appear quite weak for 
the plaintiff. After a close reading of these decisions, I am left with the impression 
that the courts’ disbelief of a retaliatory motive is a driving force behind the 
stringency of the reasonable belief doctrine. In this vein, courts may be more 
tentative about granting summary judgment and motions to dismiss for lack of 
causation, which is almost always a contested issue of fact, and more comfortable 
deciding them on the threshold question of whether the plaintiff engaged in 
protected activity, which is a question of law.243  
And yet, the application of the reasonable belief doctrine to determine whether 
the plaintiff engaged in protected activity purports to be a discrete and prior issue, 
separate from causation.244 As it should be. The reasonable belief doctrine is a poor 
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proxy for addressing weaknesses in the plaintiff’s proof of causation. This is 
especially so where the subject of the plaintiff’s complaint falls within the scope of 
the employer’s EEO policies. There is no obvious reason why retaliation would be 
less likely to trigger an adverse action when the complaint falls within the scope of 
the employer’s nondiscrimination policy, though not within judicial interpretations 
of discrimination law, than when the complaint meets the legal and factual 
requirements for proving discrimination. Concerns about causation should be dealt 
with forthrightly and transparently, instead of bleeding into the threshold 
determination of whether the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. 
Whatever the reason for the stringency with which lower courts are applying 
this doctrine, courts are quick to reject employees’ broader understanding of 
nondiscrimination rights and emphatically recite the principle that the 
reasonableness of employee beliefs is measured solely by the contours of existing 
law. As one court put it, in finding the plaintiffs’ beliefs that they were opposing 
discrimination unreasonable, the plaintiffs “called attention to no statutory or case 
law that can reasonably be believed” to support their understanding.245 Other courts 
put it even more bluntly: “A plaintiff may not stand on his ignorance of the 
substantive law to argue that his belief was reasonable.”246 This articulation of 
reasonableness as capped by the content of the governing law imposes a false 
clarity on the meaning of discrimination. Lacking any fixed or easily discernible 
meaning, the law’s promise of nondiscrimination can accommodate a broad range 
of understandings, as it has at various points in history.247 Members of “outsider” 
groups in particular—people of color, women, and sexual minorities—tend to take 
a broader view of the definition of discrimination and to perceive it more frequently 
in comparison to more powerful social groups, whose views are more likely to 
match those held by judges.248 
Most importantly, courts’ insistence on judging reasonableness by a strict legal 
meaning does not take into account how employer policies shape employees’ 
understandings of their rights at work. As a result, employers reap the legal and 
professional benefits of EEO policies without bearing legal responsibility for 
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retaliation against the employees who use them. While courts limit protection from 
retaliation to those internal complaints that match their own narrow legalistic 
conceptions of discrimination, much broader employer policies have expanded 
popular understanding of the meaning of discrimination.249 The resulting 
incongruity is not so much because companies are more progressive than the law, 
although some may be, but because many employers have recognized that strong 
EEO policies promote their self-interest. They offer some measure of “bullet-
proofing” from discrimination lawsuits and provide mechanisms for holding 
employees accountable for failing to meet company norms and professional 
expectations. 
The reasonable belief cases have utterly failed to grapple with the realities of 
employer EEO policies and their effect on employee understandings of 
discrimination and responses to it.250 Even when courts mention the existence of an 
employer policy, the scope, language, and promises of the policy have no bearing 
on the court’s reasonable belief analysis. This is a glaring hole in the reasonable 
belief case law given the role that EEO policies play in the modern workplace. In 
the reasonable belief case law, it is as if the revolution in EEO policies, catalyzed 
and accelerated by the Faragher and Ellerth decisions over fifteen years ago, has 
never taken place. 
B. Communicating Opposition: Discrimination Versus General Unfairness  
The reasonable belief doctrine is not the only challenge retaliation law faces in 
coming to terms with the EEO workplace. Another retaliation doctrine that clashes 
with employer EEO policies is the requirement that employee opposition to 
discrimination be expressed in terms that are clear and specific enough to put the 
employer on notice that the complaint is about discrimination in particular and not 
more generalized concerns about workplace fairness. Certainly, requiring some 
degree of specificity under the opposition clause is appropriate. An employee 
should not be protected from retaliation under an antidiscrimination statute for 
complaining that meetings should end at five o’clock instead of six o’clock even if 
the employee’s real concern is that the meetings were scheduled to penalize 
working mothers. Employers must be able to comprehend the nature of the 
complaint in order to determine and comply with the obligation not to retaliate. The 
problem is that, as some courts have applied it, the requirement of employer 
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knowledge demands a more precise terminology than employees use when they 
follow employer policies to voice their concerns about discrimination.  
Employer policies often address equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in 
broad terms of professionalism, respect, and fairness. As Frank Dobbin explains, 
when personnel departments took over the implementation of EEO mandates, they 
incorporated systems to promote fairness and merit under the equal opportunity 
mantle.251 In the 1980s, the terminology of equal opportunity and 
nondiscrimination was rebranded under more general headings like “human 
resources” and “diversity management.”252 As a result, instead of helping plaintiffs 
over the notice/specificity hurdle, the language of EEO policies can steer 
employees down a path that jeopardizes their protection from retaliation for 
complaining about matters that the employee perceives as discriminatory, but 
describing their complaints in more general terms. 
When a discrimination complaint is pursued through an official statutory 
enforcement mechanism (by filing a charge with the EEOC or a lawsuit in court), 
and therefore falls under the participation clause, notice of the discrimination 
complaint is provided to the employer through that process itself. But when a 
complaint is made directly to the employer, and therefore falls under the opposition 
clause, retaliation law requires enough specificity to inform the employer that the 
complainant is asserting statutory nondiscrimination rights. All of the statutes 
protecting discrimination complainants from retaliation share this requirement. 
Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, which includes the Equal Pay 
Act, courts have emphasized that “not all ‘abstract grumblings’ or vague 
expressions of discontent” amount to the kind of protected activity necessary to 
support a retaliation claim.253 The notice requirement for opposition under Title 
VII’s retaliation provision is similar. As the Third Circuit explains it: “A general 
complaint of unfair treatment is insufficient to establish protected activity under 
Title VII.”254 
While this requirement is sound in theory, depending on how it is applied and on 
how the employer’s policies shape and channel grievances, it may ensnare 
employees who use the terminology of human resources and EEO policies to 
express their complaints instead of the rights-claiming language of the underlying 
statutes. For example, in Barber v. CSX Distribution Services,255 the court ruled 
that a letter sent by the plaintiff to the company’s human resources department was 
not protected under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act because, in 
complaining that a position was filled with a less-qualified person, the letter did not 
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specify age discrimination as the reason.256 In the letter, the employee stated that he 
had twenty-one years of experience in the field, which exceeded that of the “less 
qualified individual” who got the job.257 The letter did not mention the selected 
employee’s age (forty-four), however. The court construed the letter as a complaint 
“about unfair treatment in general,” explaining that it expressed “dissatisfaction 
with the fact that someone else was awarded the position, but it does not 
specifically complain about age discrimination.”258 As a result, the letter was “too 
vague” to establish protected activity under the statute.259 No mention was made of 
the employer’s nondiscrimination policy or how it may have shaped how the 
employee expressed his grievance. 
The case is similar to others requiring employees to specify bias against a 
protected class in order to gain statutory protection from retaliation for opposing 
discrimination. Expressing a general complaint about fairness or injustice is not 
enough. In Graham v. Methodist Home for the Aging,260 for example, the plaintiff’s 
internal complaint in which she accused the employer of replacing her for speaking 
out about “injustices” was not specific enough to support her retaliation claim. 
Although her prior history with the employer included instances in which she had 
challenged racial bias on behalf of herself and others, the court reasoned that her 
reference to having spoken out about “injustices” was too vague, faulting her for 
not mentioning “race” or “discrimination,” as the opposition clause requires.261 
Another example of how insufficient specificity of a protected class derails the 
retaliation claim is Miller v. American Family Mutual Insurance.262 In that case, the 
plaintiff was paid less than any other employee in her position or in her department, 
including some colleagues she helped train. When she learned of this disparity, she 
confronted her supervisor and asked whether it was because she had been pregnant 
and had taken pregnancy leave.263 The supervisor said nothing in reply, but 
allegedly turned away and slammed a drawer. The next year, the plaintiff met with 
this same supervisor and one other manager and again protested her pay. In this 
meeting, she strenuously objected to being paid less than her coworkers, noting that 
she had trained some of them, but did not again mention her suspicion that 
pregnancy might be the reason.264 The court ruled that the plaintiff’s complaints 
about her pay at that meeting were not protected activity because she did not make 
clear that she was alleging pregnancy discrimination.265 While an employee “need 
not use the words ‘pregnancy discrimination’ to bring her speech within Title VII’s 
retaliation protections,” the court explained, “she has to at least say something to 
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indicate her pregnancy is an issue.”266 The court rejected as speculative the 
plaintiff’s “subjective belief” that the supervisors already knew that her complaints 
about pay “‘centered around’ her belief of pregnancy discrimination,” 
notwithstanding her earlier question linking the two.267 
Other plaintiffs have also lost retaliation claims for opposing pay inequality 
without specifically mentioning pay discrimination based on a protected class 
status. In Hunt v. Nebraska Public Power District,268 the plaintiff had complained 
about receiving lower pay despite taking on extra responsibilities that had been 
handled by higher-paid men.269 The court upheld the dismissal of her retaliation 
claim for lack of protected activity, ruling that her protestations about her pay did 
not specifically mention sex discrimination as the cause of the pay disparity that 
she challenged.270 
These cases keep company with others rejecting generalized complaints about 
unfair treatment as a trigger for retaliation protections. In Galdieri-Ambrosini v. 
National Realty & Development Corp.,271 the plaintiff, a secretary, had complained 
about having to perform personal tasks for her male boss and about the more 
favorable treatment given to other secretaries.272 Her theory behind her sex 
discrimination complaint was that she was punished for failing to conform to 
gender stereotypes about how secretaries should comport themselves in the 
workplace.273 She sued for both gender discrimination and retaliation and won a 
jury verdict of $100,000 for combined compensatory and punitive damages. The 
lower court granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendant and the appellate 
court affirmed.274 In rejecting the retaliation claim, the court faulted the plaintiff for 
not notifying her employer that she was complaining about sex discrimination 
specifically, as opposed to unfair treatment in general. Since she did not articulate 
her internal complaints in terms of sex discrimination, she did not sufficiently 
communicate her opposition to an unlawful employment practice under Title 
VII.275 This is a common refrain, that an employee must assert bias against a 
protected class in order to find protection from retaliation under the opposition 
clause.276 
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In communicating bias against a protected class, clarity is prized, and veiled 
references to discrimination are disfavored. In Boyd v. Honda Manufacturing. of 
Alabama, LLC,277 for example, an African American employee did not engage in 
protected activity under the opposition clause when he complained to his employer 
about the selection process, unequal training, and disparities in overtime and job 
assignments. Despite his reference to being “treated as a black sheep” of the 
department, his complaints were not protected activity because he did not “mention 
discrimination based on his race.”278 
Much like the reasonable belief cases, courts fail to consider how the employer’s 
nondiscrimination policies influence the employee’s communication of his or her 
concerns and the language used to complain. The cases rarely mention the 
existence of employer EEO policies in applying the notice requirement, much less 
incorporate them into the legal analysis. In Boyd, the case in which the employee 
complained of unequal treatment and being treated as a “black sheep,” the court did 
acknowledge the existence of a company nondiscrimination policy but did not 
connect the policy to its analysis of the notice requirement. Had it done so, the 
court may have been more accepting of the employee’s more general way of 
communicating his grievance. The very title of the policy suggests a merging of the 
employer’s promises of nondiscrimination with a more general conception of 
fairness: the “Equal Employment Opportunity and Mutual Respect Policies.”279 
Without giving further details, the court described the policy as “prohibit[ing] any 
form of discrimination in all terms and conditions of employment, including, but 
not limited to, discrimination based upon race, sex, and age,” and any “retaliation 
against an associate who reports a concern about discrimination.”280 It further noted 
that the policy requires an employee “who believes he or she has witnessed or been 
subject to discrimination or harassment to immediately report it” to a designated 
person.281 Given the “including but not limited to” language in the policy and the 
broad-sounding title, an employee might reasonably construe the policy as being 
open-ended enough to sweep beyond the narrow set of employment practices made 
unlawful under discrimination law. Moreover, nothing about the court’s description 
of the policy suggests that it made employees aware of the importance of 
specifying whether their concern was about unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
a protected class or some more general maltreatment, such as a lack of respect. 
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Complaints about harassment are especially likely to get swept up in the lack-of-
specificity net. Numerous cases involve complaints of harassing and disrespectful 
conduct that fall short of what is required for “protected activity” because they fail 
to specify the plaintiff’s protected class as the basis for the harassment. For 
example, in Smith v. International Paper Co.,282 an African American employee’s 
complaint to the employer’s human resources department about workplace 
“civility” problems and “harassment” by his white supervisor were not specific 
enough to signal that he was complaining about racial harassment or race-based 
discrimination.283 Other complaints of harassment, lacking specification of a 
protected class, have met a similar fate.284 Employer policies, however, often 
combine discriminatory harassment, including racial and sexual harassment, with 
broader references to collegiality, respect, and professionalism.285 
In addition to the hurdle of specifying a protected class in order to meet the 
specificity requirement, the employee must also communicate the specific 
employment actions or practices that the employee believes are discriminatory. 
This too poses a problem for employees whose communications are less precise 
than what courts require. For example, in Dupont-Lauren v. Schneider (USA), 
Inc.,286 the plaintiff complained to her supervisor “about the difficulties of being a 
female in the company.”287 The reference to being female surely indicated that the 
complaint concerned conduct affecting the plaintiff because of her protected class. 
The court nevertheless granted summary judgment on the retaliation claim for lack 
of protected activity because the plaintiff’s statements about the difficulties facing 
women in the company were vague and did not identify any particular employment 
practice as discriminatory.288 Employer terminology in EEO matters, however, 
often steers employees away from the rights-claiming language of discrimination 
and toward more general and diffuse labels like “diversity.”289 
Other cases also involve complaints that could be reasonably construed as 
alleging bias against a protected class but are denied protection for failing to 
specify an unlawful employment practice. In Pope v. ESA Services, Inc.,290 the 
plaintiff, a black male of Liberian descent, did not engage in protected conduct 
when he prefaced his inquiry expressing interest in being moved up to a 
management level position with the observation that there were no black district 
managers in the region.291 Because he did not attribute the absence of black 
managers to a discriminatory practice, the court ruled that he did not oppose an 
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unlawful employment practice.292 And in Rone v. U.S. Sprint,293 the court ruled that 
the plaintiff’s expression of offense at racial insensitivity by the company was not 
sufficiently connected to any unlawful employment practice by the employer.294 In 
that case, the plaintiff was terminated after complaining to the human resources 
department about an internal company newsletter using racially insensitive terms to 
describe a company training program in which the plaintiff participated. The 
newsletter described the training program, “which consisted entirely of minorities, 
targeted members of the Kansas City urban community who were welfare 
recipients or rehabilitated drug users.”295 The plaintiff complained that the article 
was offensive, but she did not accuse the company of any particular unlawful 
employment practice.296 Accordingly, the court ruled, her complaint was not 
protected activity.297 
A final example of a plaintiff’s failure to link a complaint about the treatment of 
a protected class to an unlawful employment action comes from Hill v. IGA Food 
Depot.298 In that case, the court ruled that the plaintiff, an African American 
grocery store clerk, did not engage in protected activity when he asked his 
supervisor why the store had so few African American cashiers. The court 
explained, a plaintiff must “at the very least, communicate [his] belief that 
discrimination is occurring to the employer. It is not enough for the employee 
merely to complain about a certain policy . . . and rely on the employer to infer that 
discrimination has occurred.”299 The court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s inquiry 
was “about race,” but viewed it as merely “asking a question about race or 
suggesting the desirability of diversity,” and “a far cry from alleging that an 
employee or the company is intentionally refusing to hire African-Americans.”300 
The court added that the plaintiff’s questioning was motivated by “personal 
reasons,” since his daughter had applied for a cashier position.301 However, there is 
no support in the statute for according a lower level of protection to opposition that 
is personally motivated rather than principled, even if such an elusive distinction 
could be drawn. Nor do employer policies make such a distinction in encouraging 
employees to come forward with concerns about discrimination. Regardless of the 
plaintiff’s motivation for complaining, courts require complaints to do more than 
specify a protected form of bias; the complaint must link the bias to a particular 
practice being challenged.302 
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Some courts have taken the notice requirement one step further to insist not only 
that employees specify a protected class and complain about a particular 
employment practice, but also that they express a conclusion that the practice is 
indeed unlawful. In Cyrus v. Hyundai Motor Manufacturing of Alabama, LLC,303 
the court ruled that the plaintiff’s complaints about allegedly preferential treatment 
by the Korean-owned company of its Korean employees were too ambiguous to 
qualify as protected activity under Title VII. To be protected, the court explained, 
the plaintiff must make clear his belief that what he is complaining about is actually 
unlawful.304 In that case, the plaintiff had expressed opposition to what he 
perceived as the preferential treatment of Korean employees but did not explicitly 
state a belief that the preferential treatment was national origin discrimination in 
violation of Title VII. As the court explained, “it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to alert 
Defendant that, not only is he complaining about unequal treatment, but that he also 
believes that the root cause of the unequal treatment is a form of discrimination 
prohibited by Title VII.”305 While courts offer general disclaimers that an employee 
“need not refer to the statute by name,”306 this kind of reasoning comes awfully 
close to requiring that very thing. 
Despite the pervasiveness of employer EEO policies, the case law fails to 
consider how the notice requirement comports with the way employer policies 
channel and frame employee complaints. Much sociolegal research demonstrates 
that workplace policies and cultures significantly affect how employees perceive 
and respond to discrimination.307 Strict notice requirements are in tension with EEO 
policies that lump together discrimination under broader promises of workplace 
fairness and eschew rights-claiming language about discrimination for the 
managerial language preferred by human resources staff.308 Employer policies 
blend nondiscrimination guarantees with more general concerns about fairness and 
diversity, without any cautionary instruction to employees about the importance of 
preserving their rights against retaliation and articulating specific complaints about 
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discrimination.309 Instead, the policies steer employees toward more general 
terminologies, which employees internalize and use in expressing their concerns.310 
Complaints about what might be labeled “discrimination” are channeled into more 
general complaints about unfair treatment and interpersonal conflicts.311 Employee 
training programs reinforce this by going beyond conveying legal rules against 
discrimination to include broader kinds of diversity training.312 Instead of 
cautioning plaintiffs to take care in identifying discrimination, employer policies 
use directive language instructing employees to report their concerns under broad 
headings that lump potentially actionable complaints in with other grievances. 
When employee complaints are successfully channeled in this way, they lose out on 
the protections of retaliation law. 
Together, these two doctrines make for a troubling disconnect between 
retaliation law and the realities of EEO governance. The concluding section 
considers some of the implications of this mismatch and sketches the outlines of a 
proposal for resolving them. 
IV. TWO DOCTRINAL FIXES AND A CONCLUDING ANALYSIS  
Unless retaliation law catches up with the integrated role employer policies and 
complaint processes play in the overall legal framework of employment 
discrimination law, the Supreme Court’s pro-plaintiff cases and exhortations about 
the importance of retaliation protections will have a hollow ring. Two fixes would 
go a long way toward securing the integrity of retaliation law against the 
background of EEO realities, without requiring statutory amendment or reversal of 
any Supreme Court decision. 
First, it is time to recognize that the sharp split between internal and external 
complaints as the dividing line between Title VII’s opposition and participation 
clauses no longer makes sense. Placing internal EEO complaints under the 
participation clause, instead of casting them off to the weaker protections of the 
opposition clause, would avoid the harshness of the reasonable belief doctrine since 
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only subjective, good-faith participation is required by the participation clause. It 
would also avoid the problems of the notice/specificity requirement if courts treated 
notice of a complaint brought pursuant to an employer policy that covers 
discrimination as sufficient notice for protected activity, much as they do for 
externally filed complaints under the participation clause.  
Using the participation clause for internal complaints pursuant to employer 
discrimination policies would recognize the extent to which such policies have 
become integrated into the legal framework of employment discrimination law. 
Only the most formalistic reading of the participation clause supports excluding 
internal complaints from the protections of that clause.  
A recent case from the Second Circuit typifies the reasoning lower courts have 
used to exclude internal complaint processes from the participation clause. In 
Townsend v. Benjamin Enterprises,313 the plaintiff, a human resources director, 
alleged that she was fired for conducting an investigation into an employee’s 
charge that she was sexually harassed by the company vice president.314 Since the 
plaintiff had not yet completed the investigation when she was fired, and therefore 
could not have had a reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination occurred, she 
chose to forego a claim under the opposition clause and instead sought the 
protections of the participation clause.315 The Second Circuit rejected this claim, 
joining the other lower courts that have ruled on this issue in reading the 
participation clause as not encompassing internal complaints.316  
Under this view, the language of the participation clause, which protects an 
employee “because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any 
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter,”317 refers 
only to the enforcement mechanisms codified in the statute—that is, filing a charge 
with a government enforcement agency or suing in court.318 Like other circuit 
courts, the court in Townsend read this language to exclude any internal complaint 
process that takes place in the absence of a formal charge filed with the EEOC or 
parallel state enforcement agency.319 Despite the unanimity on this point in the 
lower courts, the Supreme Court has left this an open issue; in allowing the claim in 
Crawford to proceed under the opposition clause, the Court specifically left 
undecided the question of whether internal employer investigations of 
discrimination complaints might fall within the participation clause.320 Recognizing 
coverage under the participation clause would best serve the goals the Court has 
identified in ensuring a workable statutory enforcement scheme. 
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The lower courts’ reading of the participation clause divorces the lodging of 
formal complaints from the liability rules courts have crafted to decide them. This 
approach treats statutory interpretation, regulatory guidance, and everyday 
employer practices for complying with the law as not “law” at all and therefore not 
operating “under this subchapter.” Their narrow, technical reading of the 
participation clause contrasts with the purposive approach taken by the Supreme 
Court in its retaliation decisions, which places a premium on the effectiveness and 
workability of the statute. Unless the gaps in retaliation doctrine are closed, any 
triumph of pragmatism over formalism will bypass the employees who address 
concerns about discrimination through the internal EEO processes their employers 
have set up to capitalize on the legal incentives for creating such processes. 
The more purposive reading of the participation clause advocated here is not 
foreclosed by the literal text of the clause.321 Although Congress may not have 
originally intended internal employer investigations and complaint processes to fall 
within that clause,322 it could not have foreseen the proliferation and subsequent 
connection of such policies, through judicial interpretation, to the official 
enforcement scheme established by the statute. So far, lower courts have failed to 
appreciate that their narrower reading reflects an interpretive choice, not only about 
how to read the participation clause, but also about whether to acknowledge the 
role played by employer EEO policies in the enforcement of discrimination law.  
As employer EEO processes have become more integral to statutory 
enforcement, the sharp split between the participation and opposition clauses has 
become increasingly anachronistic. The existence of employer policies for handling 
employee complaints about discrimination is now firmly embedded in the liability 
rules crafted by the Court for harassment claims specifically, and more generally 
with respect to punitive damages, for all kinds of discrimination claims. Employer 
EEO policies are also expressly encouraged by the EEOC, and as sociolegal 
scholarship discussed above demonstrates, these policies greatly influence both 
courts and the EEOC in their determinations of whether the employer complied 
with the law. These policies also operate in the workplaces to set the norms and 
expectations for employee nondiscrimination rights at work. Treating employer 
EEO processes as outside of Title VII’s statutory enforcement framework does not 
comport with their place in employment discrimination law or with the Supreme 
Court’s purposive approach to statutory interpretation in its retaliation decisions.  
Roping internal complaints into the participation clause would also better 
comport with the law’s incentives for voluntary compliance. Otherwise, the broader 
retaliation protections of the participation clause create the incentive for employees 
to bypass internal complaint processes and go straight to formal enforcement in 
order to maximize protection from retaliation. Such an incentive is terribly at odds 
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with the Court’s pronouncements encouraging voluntary compliance and internal 
employer processes for resolving complaints.323 
In addition to treating internal complaints pursuant to employer discrimination 
policies under the participation clause, a second doctrinal fix is for courts to take 
into account how employer EEO policies shape employee perceptions about 
discrimination and expressions of complaints in retaliation claims that are decided 
under the opposition clause. When courts apply the reasonable belief doctrine and 
the notice/specificity requirement under the opposition clause, they should 
carefully consider how employer nondiscrimination policies influenced the 
complainant’s understanding of discrimination and communications in opposition 
to it.  
While it is likely too late to convince the Court to abandon an objective 
reasonableness requirement under the opposition clause in favor of a subjective 
good-faith standard, there is no reason why reasonableness should be determined 
independent of employer policies defining and prohibiting discrimination. Such 
policies should be highly relevant to judicial determination of the reasonableness of 
the employee’s belief that discrimination occurred, regardless of the narrower 
scope of unlawful discrimination in the governing law. Neither the text of the 
opposition clause nor the Supreme Court’s precedent forecloses such a result. 
Although in Breeden itself the Court did not discuss how the employer’s sexual 
harassment policy affected the plaintiff’s actions, it did not foreclose lower courts 
from taking into account such considerations. Over a decade of experience with the 
reasonable belief doctrine in the lower courts since Breeden demonstrates the need 
for courts to take employer policies into account in determining the reasonableness 
of employee understandings of discrimination.  
Likewise, the way employees frame discrimination complaints may reflect the 
terminology and direction of employer EEO policies. Rather than rigidly 
demanding that employees use the terminology of discrimination and unlawful 
employment practices in order to protect a complaint under the opposition clause, 
courts should allow employees as much flexibility as employer policies do in 
framing their complaints. If the employer understands the complaint to fall within 
the contours of its policy covering discrimination, that should be enough to satisfy 
the specificity requirement of the opposition clause. 
Unless courts do a better job integrating retaliation law with employer’s internal 
complaint processes, there will be a vast gulf between the on-paper protections of 
retaliation law promised by the Supreme Court and the day-to-day risks employees 
face in actually using these processes to address discrimination. The gaps in 
retaliation law identified in this Article give cause for concern that employer 
antidiscrimination policies and complaint processes are not fulfilling the role that 
the law has set for them. Existing academic critiques of internal EEO governance 
have not paid enough attention to the potential for such mechanisms to undermine 
legal protections from retaliation for complaining about inequality in the 
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workplace. While the train toward internal EEO governance has long left the 
station and is likely unstoppable, there should at least be recognition of how that 
train is derailing the increasingly pro forma protections of retaliation law.  
Focusing only on the pro-plaintiff cases in the Supreme Court docket leaves an 
overly rosy view of retaliation law. Adjusting the lens to spotlight internal 
complaints against the backdrop of employer EEO policies reveals a different 
picture. Instead of a contrast with the Court’s pro-employer bent in employment 
discrimination cases, there is a consistency in how retaliation law functions to 
reinforce the Court’s worldview. The anti-retaliation story line from the Supreme 
Court docket feeds into the Court’s skeptical approach to discrimination claims and 
a belief that real discrimination—what the law recognizes as unlawful 
discrimination—is rare and is adequately addressed when it does occur. The veneer 
of robust protection from retaliation gives the impression of full and open access 
for employee complaints about discrimination—which in turn supports judicial 
skepticism about the prevalence of discrimination. Through this feedback loop, 
retaliation law functions not to enhance law enforcement, but to legitimate the 
narrow scope of discrimination law and to support a skeptical view of the 
prevalence of discrimination in the modern EEO-saturated workplace. 
  
